THE MADHYA PRADESH POLICE VIDHEYAK, 2001
NEED FOR AMENDMENTS
Introduction
In any discussion on police problems, the British invariably receive flak for the type of police system they established in this country through the Police Act of 1861(The 1861 Act). The argument is that the Act was legislated after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and that the colonial rulers were not interested in establishing a people friendly police force here. They wanted to establish a police force, which could be used to consolidate and perpetuate their rule in the country.
Foreign rule in this country ended more than 54 years ago. How long shall we keep on blaming the British for establishing the police system they did? Why has no government - central or state - taken the initiative to replace the Police Act of 1861 with new legislation, which would give the country or the state a different police force?
It is not as if no new legislation has been passed. Some state governments have enacted new legislation since Independence to govern the functioning of their police forces. For instance, the Police Forces in Maharashtra and Gujarat are governed by the Bombay Police Act of 1951, in Kerala by the Kerala Police Act of 1960, in Karnataka by the Karnataka Police Act of 1963, in Delhi by the Delhi Police Act of 1978 etc. The enactment of these laws after Independence has not brought about any significant improvement in the organisational structure, performance or behaviour of the Police Forces. The reason - the new enactments were patterned on the model of the old 1861 legislation. They are as silent and remiss about the new requirements of democratic policing as the colonial legislation was.
The police forces in states/union territories have thus continued to be governed by the 1861 Act or by legislation modeled on that Act. Now that another state government is taking the initiative to replace the 1861 Act with their own model i.e the Madhya Pradesh Police Vidheyak,2001 (the MP Bill) this is an opportune moment to review critically the main provisions of the new Bill.
The Government of MP should not rush into legislating the Bill. A Bill, which purports to replace a century and four decades old legislation, must be debated widely. It should become a law after the government has received and considered comments/suggestions from different quarters.
There are many inadequacies and shortcomings in the MP Bill in its present form. A few important ones are discussed below:
Preamble
The Preamble to the Bill is as follows:
“A Bill to reorganise the police in Madhya Pradesh, reorient its responsibility for good governance and dedicated impartial service in protecting human dignity to improve the quality of life through solicitous care for women, children, members of the minorities, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, other backward classes, the poor and the physically and mentally challenged persons and equip it to meet the exigencies of urbanisation, industrailisation and modernisation.”
This preamble is confusing and inadequate. A preamble is supposed to convey the basic ideas and spirit of the legislation. Any preamble to a Police Act must meet at least the following four requirements:
• It must mandate the police to function as a service to protect and promote the rule of law.
• It must recognise the paramount obligation of the police to function according to the requirements of the Constitution.
• It must require the police to be professional and service oriented.
• It must state the need for the police to be efficient and effective in discharging its basic responsibilities to prevent and detect crime, maintain order and security of the state without violating citizens’ rights.
The Preamble needs to be revised to clearly state the above objectives. The Preamble to the Bill should in fact incorporate the ideas figuring in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. The following version is suggested:
“A Bill to reorganise the police in Madhya Pradesh, so as to make it a highly professional and service oriented organisation dedicated to rendering impartial service to the community and protecting and promoting the rule of law; efficient in preventing and detecting crime, maintaining public order and security of state, while protecting the rights of the citizens; and functions according to the requirements of the Constitution, law and democratic aspirations of the people.”
Statement of Objects and Reasons
The statement of objects and reasons given in the beginning of the Bill has been reproduced from the Preamble to the model Police Bill drafted by the National Police Commission (NPC Bill).
The statement of objects should be reflected in specific provisions in the Bill. Unfortunately, the MP Bill in its present form does not have provisions incorporating the objects mentioned in this Statement. To give one example, the Bill is completely silent in so far as accountability is concerned. While the statement loudly proclaims that making the police accountable is one of the objectives, the Bill does not set up any mechanisms to ensure police accountability.
Para 3 of the Statement lists out the “salient features of the proposed bill.” There are 12 items in this list. Except item (i), the other new features of the Bill would hardly qualify to cover the basic objectives mentioned in the statement.
It is being claimed that a salient feature of the MP Bill [(para3 (ii)] is that it provides ”exemplary punishment to police officers for misconduct and other acts against the members of the public.” This is not true. For instance, Section 45 of the Bill, which penalises certain offences committed by police officers against the members of the public, has been borrowed from Section 129 of the NPC Bill. While the penalty prescribed in the NPC Bill for the offences extends to one year, the MP Bill has reduced the term of imprisonment to six months. Increase in fine from Rupees five hundred prescribed in the NPC Bill to Rs one thousand laid down in the Bill only accounts for the fall in the value of money that has taken place since the NPC days.
“The provision for compensation for injuries to persons and damages to property during riots or unlawful assemblies”[para 3 (iv)] is being claimed as a salient provision. There is nothing new in these provisions. Sections 13 to 15 of the Police Act of 1861 provide for recovery of compensation if the misconduct during riots causes injuries to persons or damage to property. The Bill reproduces the provisions in the NPC Bill. In any case, experience reveals that these provisions in law are redundant, as these are never implemented.
If the objectives mentioned in the statement could be reflected in specific provisions in the Bill, this would probably become one of the best pieces of legislation on Police in the statute book. However, this has not been done and the present Bill falls far short of establishing a democratic and people friendly system of policing in the state.
Control/Superintendence of the Police Force
Control over the police in this country is exercised by the state government. Section 3 of the Police Act of 1861 vests the superintendence of the state police force in the state government
There are many reasons for the poor quality of policing in this country, but a major reason identified time and again by committee after committee and inquiry after inquiry has been the type of control that has been exercised over the police. There is enough evidence to prove that the type of control that has been exercised over the police by the state governments has generally led to gross abuses. Almost all State Police Commissions, the National Police Commission and other expert bodies, which have examined police problems, have found overwhelming evidence of misuse and abuse of police system by politicians and bureaucrats for narrow selfish ends. The situation resulting from wrong control over the police has become worse during the last few decades because of increasing criminalisation of politics. Bad elements in politics and in the police have now become a strong mutually supporting system whose influence permeates the police and negates its ability to be a crime fighting force or an organization pledged to uphold the law and protect the people or the constitution.
The National Police Commission examined this subject in detail. Even though the quality of control exercised over the police in those days was not as bad as it has now become, the NPC realised the serious threat that poor control over the police posed to the quality of policing. The Commission made numerous recommendations to insulate the police from outside illegitimate control. The Commission felt that there was an immediate need to devise a new mechanism of control and supervision, which would help the State Government to discharge their superintending responsibility in an open manner under the framework of law. For this purpose, they recommended the constitution of a statutory commission in each State to be called the State Security Commission. In this scheme of things, the superintendence of the police force vests in the State Government but is to be exercised through the State Security Commission.
The N.P.C Bill authorises the State Government to appoint a Director General/Inspector General of Police for the direction and supervision of the Police Force. The selection of the Chief of Police has to be made from a panel of not more than three IPS officers of that cadre prepared by a Committee consisting of the Chairman or Member of the UPSC, Union Home Secretary, the senior-most amongst the heads of the CPOs, the Chief Secretary of the State and the existing Chief of Police in the State. Posting from the panel should be according to seniority.
Another recommendation made by the NPC was that the Chief of Police in a State should be assured of a statutory tenure of office to enable the organisation to resist outside pressures and illegal or irregular orders. The term of office of the Director General/Inspector General of Police appointed under the Act should be four years from the date of his appointment.
One of the prominent reasons for the vulnerability of the police to illegitimate pressures is the threat of transfer that always hangs on the heads of police officers, particularly when they resist pressures. Transfer and suspension are two weapons frequently used by the politician to bend the police officers down to his will. It is not always easy to take statutory punitive action against police personnel under the disciplinary rules, but transfers can be effected on grounds of administrative expediency without difficulty. As the Padmanabhaiah Committee on Police Reforms has said: “ One of the main reasons for the politicisation of the police is the lack of a proper tenure policy for posting of officers at various levels and the arbitrary transfers and postings which have been used for political interest”. To protect police officers against arbitrary and whimsical transfer orders, there should be provisions in the Bill specifying the authorities competent to issue transfer orders regarding different ranks.
The MP Bill vests the superintendence of the police force through out the state of MP in the State Government. This type of clause vesting the general superintendence of the police force in the state government is there in all the Police Acts. The Bill, however, goes a step further and extends the clause by specifically stating that “any control, direction or supervision exercisable by any officer over any member of the police force shall be exercisable subject to such superintendence”.
The extended clause of the MP Bill would have the effect of giving the state government power to intervene in all matters relating to police work- administrative as well as operational. The extension amounts to saying that an order issued by any police officer concerning another police officer can be rescinded or amended by the government if they want to do so. All orders regarding transfers, postings, suspensions, rewards and punishments in respect of police officers issued by the departmental leadership come within the purview of this clause. In fact, the government can even issue directions as to how investigation of criminal cases should be supervised.
The word “Superintendence” has not been defined in any legislation. The word has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Havala Case judgement of 1998. The Court was examining the validity of the Single Directive- a set of instructions issued by the central government prohibiting the CBI from inquiring into complaints of corruption received against officers of the rank of Joint Secretary and above. The plea made before the Court was that the power of superintendence that the central government exercised over the CBI by virtue of Section 4 (1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 allowed the government to issue instructions contained in the Single Directive. The Supreme Court refused to accept such a broad definition of ‘superintendence’. In the Supreme Courts interpretation, “The general superintendence over the functioning of the Department ….would not include within it the control of the initiation and the actual process of investigation, i.e direction;” nor would it “permit supervision of the actual investigation of an offence by the CBI contrary to the manner provided by the statutory provisions.’’
Earlier, the NPC had deliberated on this subject. The Commission examined the rulings of the Supreme Court relating to Article 227 of the Constitution according to which every High Court is authorised to exercise superintendence over all courts in the State. Based on the general principles enunciated in these judgements, the Commission recommended that “the power of superintendence of the State Government over the police should be limited for the purpose of ensuring that police performance is in strict accordance with law”.
To ensure reform, which is the intention of any amending or new legislation, it is important that the word ”superintendence” should be clearly interpreted to exclude use of the police for wrong and illegitimate purposes. This is the crux of reform.
Governments almost all over the world exercise control over the Police forces in some way or the other. What matters is the quality of control, the purpose for and the manner in which it is being exercised. In India, the 1861 Act and the MP Bill merely talk of control and superintendence over the police force and are silent as to how that control should be exercised. The Police Acts in other countries make it a statutory responsibility of the government to set up an adequate, efficient and effective police service in an area. It is this statutory obligation which makes the governments accountable for their failures in field of policing and forces them to take steps to monitor police performance and take concerted action to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police force.
Police Accountability
The police enjoy tremendous powers over the lives and liberties of citizens. History of policing in different parts of the world and our own experience tell us that these powers are not always used to uphold the rule of law. In fact, sometimes these powers are used for a purpose and in a manner that brings the rule of law into disrepute. Whenever this happens, it destroys public confidence not merely in the police but in the democratic system and its processes, which the police in a democratic society are supposed to safeguard. That is why it is being increasingly accepted all over the democratic world that the police must be made accountable for what they do and what they do not do.
Police accountability has two facets. Firstly, the organisation is responsible to provide an efficient and effective police cover to the community, and secondly, its individual members are expected to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. Thus so far as public is concerned, there may be dissatisfaction with the failure of the organisation to provide a feeling of safety and security to the community and there may be complaints from citizens against the misuse of powers by the individual policemen.
The Police Act of 1861 talks only of control over the police but is conspicuously silent about police accountability. The police in this country were a ruler appointed police and they continued to remain so. They therefore remained unaccountable to anyone except their own hierarchy and the executive. No external institutional mechanisms of police accountability were therefor set up.
The MP Bill does not set up a single accountability mechanism to ensure that the community gets an efficient, effective and honest police cover to the community and that the citizens' complaints against the individual instances of police misconduct are inquired into impartially, speedily and effectively. There is not much difference between the 1861 Act and the MP Bill in so far as police accountability is concerned. The 2001 Bill is as silent and remiss as the 1861 Act.
Two suggestions need to be made. Firstly, the Bill should set up a Directorate of Police Evaluation (DOPE) independent of the police organisation. The Padmanabhaiah Committee on Police Reforms has made this recommendation too. The Directorate should carry out annual inspections of the district police forces as well as of the specialised units functioning in the State Police. It should also carry out thematic inspections periodically. The independent inspection reports would help in monitoring the performance of the police force, identifying the areas of weaknesses and shortcomings and ensuring that standards are maintained. It can function like a watchdog. Since the Unit has the specialised knowledge, it will provide to the government a means of getting an independent, objective and professional assessment on the working of the police force in the state and enable it to take measures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police force. It will also provide to the head of the police force an independent assessment by experts who are not involved in the operations. The Inspectorate can draw its members from retired heads of the police force and outsiders with a mix of different skills and backgrounds.
Secondly, The present system of dealing with public complaints against police personnel departmentally fails on many grounds. The most serious objection against it is that it lacks public faith and credibility. Different models of civilian oversight of policing exist in foreign countries One is the most independent model, where citizens’ participation in dealing with public complaints against police personnel is the highest. This system employs paid, civilian, professional investigators to receive complaints; conduct fact-finding inquiries; review police reports; and make recommendations to the chief of police. In the other model, police personnel do investigations, but review of investigations is done by a civilian or a board of civilians, who then recommend action to the chief of police. In the third model, the internal affairs department of police receives complaints; conducts inquiries; and recommends action to the chief of police. If the complainant is dissatisfied with the result, he or she can complain to an appeal board, which includes civilian personnel. The board reviews the complaint and may recommend a different disposition to the chief.
There has been considerable dissatisfaction with the working of these bodies abroad. The criticism is mainly on two grounds. Firstly, public are not happy with a system where investigations into their complaints are done by the police officers. Secondly, they want these bodies to have a say in determining the disciplinary action against the officers found guilty.
The Bill should set up an independent, fair, effective and transparent police complaints body, which ensures that each and every public complaint against the police is conducted justly, promptly, thoroughly and without prejudice. The composition of such a body, its charter of functions, the process of handling complaints, investigation and supervisory procedures, action to be taken on its recommendations can be worked out once the decision to set up an independent complaints system is taken.
Impunity
Policing in a democratic society means functioning according to the rule of law. No one is above the law of the land and no one can be allowed to go unpunished when violating that law. This rule is as binding to police personnel as to ordinary citizens. In fact more so. Courts across the world routinely punish people in positions of trusteeship such as law enforcers with far greater severity because apart from the crime they have committed they have also breached the public trust and contributed to breaking confidence in the law.
It is, however, a hard fact that many state functionaries, even in democratic societies, including police personnel, succeed in getting away after committing major crimes. This happens due to various reasons. Crimes do not come to the surface because evidence is covered up. Investigations are not done effectively to unearth violations of law. Victims are intimidated or threatened to remain silent. Colleagues are not willing to blow the whistle and maintain a code of silence. However, an important source of impunity in many cases is the law itself, which does not allow prosecutions to be launched against the delinquent officers without sanction of the government. In order to make a beginning to break the unethical solidarity within the force itself and to build an environment that encourages the weeding out of the bad eggs from the force, the law needs to be reformed so that public servants cannot hide behind its provisions. If it cannot be done for all public officials, at least any reforming legislation relating to police must remove the barriers that presently exist to protect wrongdoers in the force.
There is no provision in the Police Act of 1861, which can be utilised by the government to grant or the police officer to enjoy impunity. It allows prosecution to be launched against the police officer provided it is done within a period of three months of the alleged deed and after giving one month’s notice in writing about the proposed action. However, if the act done is under the authority of a warrant, that plea can be made in defence by the concerned police officer. According to the Police Act, 1861:" when any act of prosecution shall be brought or any proceedings held against any police officer for any act done by him in such capacity, it shall be lawful for him to plead that such act was done by him under the authority of a warrant issued by a Magistrate." The Act however does not have any provision regarding the tort liability of the government or the police department for wrongful and illegal acts of police officers committed during performance of duties.
The NPC Bill follows the provisions contained in the CrPC, which can be utilised to grant immunity to police officers in cases of misconduct. Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code, provides that a public servant cannot be prosecuted without the sanction of the appropriate authorities for acts done “while acting or purporting to actin the discharge of his official duties.” The purpose of this provision of law is to ensure that frivolous and vexatious complaints are not filed against police officers to demoralise them and dissuade them from performing their duties. However, it is a fact that this provision of law has been abused to provide almost blanket protection to police officers even in serious cases of misconduct. This happens because of nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and police officers, which deliberately delays or denies sanctions for prosecutions. Eight years ago, the law Commission of India recommended that this provision should be amended to explain that it would not apply to any offence committed by a public servant, “being an offence against the human body committed in respect of a person in his custody, nor to any other offence constituting an abuse of authority.”
The National Police Commission has also recommended that protection available to the police officers under Sections 132 and 197 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 should be withdrawn so that the complainant is free to press his complaint against police official for a judicial pronouncement without having to obtain prior permission of the competent authority for such prosecution. However, contrary to this recommendation, the NPC's Police Bill debars the courts from taking any cognizance of offences under the prior sanction of the state government, when the accused is a police officer. Another provision in the NPC's Bill says that "No police officer shall be liable to any penalty or to payment of damages on account of an act done in good faith in pursuance or intended pursuance of any duty imposed or any authority conferred on him" by law.
The MP Bill also does not allow any court “to take cognizance of any offence under this Act when the accused person or any one of the accused is a police officer except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence by, or with the previous sanction of the Director General of Police.” This provision is exactly similar to the one contained in section 132 of the NPCBill, except for one difference. While the NPC Bill requires that prior permission for such prosecution has to be taken from the State Government, the MP Bill accords the power to sanction prosecution of police officers to the Director General of Police.
Lawmakers a century and four decades ago did not think it necessary to have a provision in law, which could be misused to provide escape to guilty but protected and patronised officers. In sharp contrast, the laws framed during the present days when the country is independent and democratic have provisions, which could be wrongly utilised to grant impunity.
The doctrine of governmental immunity is not recognised in the Police Acts of other countries. The Police Act of South Africa allows legal proceedings to be instituted against the local government for “an alleged act performed” or “an alleged failure to do anything which should have been done in terms of this Act or any other law, by any member of a municipal or metropolitan police service.”
The Police Act of UK makes the chief officer of police “liable in respect of torts committed by constables under his direction and control in the performance or purported performance of their functions” and shall “in respect of any such tort be treated for all purposes as a joint tortfeasor”
The Police Act of British Columbia in Canada makes a distinction between the government and the personal liability of the police officer in such cases. The liability of the government at all levels is total. The Minister on behalf of the government is jointly and severally liable for torts committed by police officers in the performance of their duties. A municipality, regional district board or government corporation are liable for torts committed by their police officers, while performing duties. There will be no personal liability except in certain circumstances. According to the legislation, “No action for damages lies against a police officer appointed under this Act for anything said or done by him or her in the performance or intended performance of his or her duty or in the exercise of his or her power or for any alleged neglect or default in the performance or intended performance of his or her duty or exercise of his or her power.” This immunity, however, is not available if the police officer “has been guilty of dishonesty, gross negligence or malicious or willful misconduct or the cause of action is libel or slander”
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has thus not been recognised by the Police Acts of the countries mentioned in this paper. In the USA also, this doctrine has either been extensively modified or completely abolished in different states. Recognition of governmental liability for the improper conduct of its police officers is being regarded as a greater incentive for the executive and the police leadership to institute the kinds of policies and practices that will guard against tort liability. Consequently, the American Bar Association, while prescribing standards for criminal justice, has recognised the need to do away with the system of governmental immunity.
One of the standards prescribed by the Association is: “In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the tort liability for improper police activities, governmental immunity, where it still exists, should be abolished, and legislation should be enacted providing that governmental subdivisions shall be fully liable for the actions of police officers who are acting within the scope of their employment.”
Consultation with the Community
The Indian Police is a ‘regime police’. The idea of the police being a part of the community and accountable to it has never grown in the Indian soil. It is not at all surprising that the Police Act of 1861 talks of the community or the inhabitants of an area only in terms of their responsibility to maintain order and penalties that should be imposed on them in case of failure to do so. There is not a single provision in this Act, which suggests the need on the part of the police to consult the community or involve them in any way in their work.
The NPC Bill also has no provision that specifically requires the police to consult the community about their policing needs and priorities or establish better relations with them. There is just one provision in the NPC Bill that authorises the Superintendent or Commissioner of Police to constitute Defence Societies for protecting persons, securing property and public safety.
The MP Bill is as silent on this issue as the 1861 Act. The 1861 Act reflected the relationship between the colonial ruler and his subjects. But can this lack of people’s participation or consultation be the parameter for policing in a democratic society today?
Amongst all the developments that have occurred in international policing during the last few decades, the most popular and widespread has been that of community policing. It has been increasingly realised in different parts of the world that if policing has to succeed it must involve the community in defining, guiding and helping the performance of the police. The Police Acts of other countries have specific provisions to obtain community’s views on policing and emphasise the need to establish good relations between the police and the community.
In South Africa, the Constitution itself makes it the “political responsibility” of each province “to promote good relations between the police and the community” and to appoint a commission of inquiry into any breakdown in relations between the two. The South Africa Police Act, 1995 gives effect to the provisions of the Constitution by prescribing the establishment of Community Police Forums at police station level to act as forums for liaison between the Police Service and the community. The liaison is meant to assist in :
establishing and maintaining a partnership between the community and the police;
promoting communication and co-operation between the police and the community;
improving the rendering of the police services in the community;
improving transparency in the Service and accountability of the Service to the community; and
promoting joint problem identification and problem solving by the Service and the community.
In addition to forums, the Act establishes community police boards at area and provincial levels. The area community police boards are to consist of representatives of community police forums in each area, while provincial community police boards are to include representatives of all area community police boards in that province.
The UK Police Act requires that “ arrangements shall be made for each police area for obtaining (a) the views of the people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area, and (b) their co-operation with the police in preventing crime in that area.” These arrangements are to be made by the police authority for each area and by Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis under the guidance of the Secretary of State.
the Bill must incorporate provisions that establish police-community liaison groups or committees at various levels, which would help in improving the police community relations and assist the police in controlling crime and maintaining law and order. The Bill must provide for the composition of the committees, their charter of functions and responsibilities, meetings to be held at different levels and procedures for follow up action to be taken on the meetings between the community members and police personnel.
Discipline
According to the Bill, the police officer is to be considered to be always on duty and can not resign or withdraw himself from duties unless allowed to do so. The upper subordinate officers, like Assistant Sub-Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors of Police can not resign within three years from the completion of basic training and if they do so they will have to reimburse the expenditure incurred on heir training. This provision discriminates against these officers, as officers of other ranks are not required to return the money spent on their training at the time of leaving the service within three years of joining it. It is therefore suggested that this provision should be deleted or made applicable to all ranks.
The list of disciplinary penalties prescribed by the Bill is fairly comprehensive. However, there are two points we would like to stress. Firstly, the Bill does not require the officer to record his order of punishment along with the reasons for the same. When a major punishment like dismissal from service etc. is being awarded, it is only fair to insist that the officer giving the punishment must record his order and his reasons for awarding that punishment. Secondly, the Bill is silent about the authorities to whom appeals against penalties can be made. The Bill must set up a mechanism to hear appeals against punishment orders, prescribing the authorities to whom the aggrieved party can make appeals.
In addition to the offences committed by a police officer against his department, he is also guilty of committing offences against citizens. According to the Bill, a police officer is guilty of an offence if he
(a) “without lawful authority or reasonable cause enters to search or causes to be entered or searched any building, vessel, tent or place;
(b) vexatiously and unnecessarily seizes the property of any person;
(c) vexatiously and unnecessarily detains, searches or arrests any person;
(d) offers any unnecessary personal violence to any person in his custody;
(e) holds out any threat or promise not warranted by law to an accused person”.
Three points need to be made in this regard. Firstly, while Section 129 of the NPC Bill on which this provision is based, prescribes the period of punishment as one-year imprisonment for these offences, the Bill reduces the penalty to six months sentence. These are all serious violations of human rights. There is absolutely no justification for showing any leniency in penalising the offenders.
Secondly, another offence should be added to this list. One common complaint of citizens is that they are unauthorisedly detained in the police stations and are forwarded to the magistrate with considerable delay. To curb this practice, it should be made a specific offence in the Bill to do so. Sub-section (f) may be added to Section 45 of the Bill on the following lines: “(f) Vexatiously and unnecessarily delaying the forwarding of any arrested person to the Magistrate or to any other authority to whom he is legally bound to forward such person.”
Thirdly, Sub-section (e) of Section 45 of the Bill should not be confined only to accused persons. The police are known to hold out threats or promises to others too, like witnesses. We, therefore, suggest that this sub-section should read only as follows: “(e) holds out any threat or promise not warranted by law.”
Summing Up
Briefly, the following amendments must be introduced in the Bill:
1) The Preamble to the Bill should be amended to convey the basic ideas underlying the new legislation.
2) Most objectives of the Bill stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons are not reflected in the provisions of the Bill. The Bill should be amended to incorporate specific provisions to achieve the objectives.
3) Section 4 of the Bill should be amended to merely state that the superintendence of the police force through out the state of Madhya Pradesh vests in and is exercisable by the state government.
4) The Bill should define the word ‘Superintendence’ and make arrangements to ensure that the power of superintendence of the State Government over the police is so exercised as to ensure that police performance is in strict accordance with law.
5) The Bill must make it a statutory responsibility of the government to establish an efficient and effective system of policing in the state. It should set objectives and define performance standards.
6) The Bill should set up credible and effective complaint handling mechanisms and procedures.
7) The Bill should set up independent mechanisms to monitor and inspect police performance.
8) The Bill should establish institutional arrangements to consult the community and involve them in police work.
9) The Bill should not have any provision that helps in getting impunity in cases of misconduct and wrong doing. Section 50 of the Bill should be deleted.
10) Section 10 (3) of the Bill should be deleted as it discriminates against upper subordinate officers or this provision should be made applicable to all ranks.
11) The offences listed out in Section 45 of the Bill are serious violations of citizens’ rights. The penalty of six months sentence on conviction is low and as recommended by the National Police Commission should be one year imprisonment.
12) One common complaint of citizens is that they are unauthorisedly detained in the police stations and are forwarded to the magistrate with considerable delay. To curb this practice, it should be made a specific offence in the Bill to do so.
13) Sub-section (e) of Section 45 of the Bill should not be confined only to accused persons. A police officer holding out any threat or promise not warranted by law should be liable for conviction under this Section.
