The Mumbai Violence- Failure of Police Preventive Action
The manner in which the incident of violence that occurred in Mumbai on August 11 was handled by the police has evoked mixed reactions. While some, including a few retired police officers, have commended the police for controlling the situation by using minimum force, others have condemned the soft approach adopted by the police in tackling the situation.
By transferring the head of the Mumbai police so soon after the incident, the Maharashtra Government has given the impression that they hold him responsible for failing to control the public order situation. Mr R. R Patil tried to convey that the Police Commissioner’s transfer was a routine administrative decision and had nothing to do with his handling of riotous situation. Nobody has bought this theory. The government kicked the officer upstairs to occupy a chair which no Mumbai Police Commissioner would willingly like to inhabit.
The fact that transfers, postings and appointments of police officers have been badly politicised in this country is well known. What makes the situation uglier in this case is that the transfer was done after Raj Thackeray demanded his resignation in his speech at MNS rally. This has sent a signal and it confirms a peculiar notion that has developed in this country during the last couple of years following Anna Hazare and Baba Ramdev’s agitation that anyone who can collect a crowd can shape governments’ decisions. Walter Lipmann, the famous American journalist had seen the dangers to democracy itself of pandering to large scale unrestrained and unauthorised expression of public opinion. We are witnessing this happening day in and day out in this country.
The crowd puller can also commit violations of law brazenly and with impunity. MNS had not been given permission by the police to march from Girgaum Chowpatty to Azad Maidan, but they did it openly, knowing fully well that the government would not dare to take action against them.
The handling of Mumbai incident has some similarities with the way the police dealt with riots that occurred in London and some other cities of the UK in August 2011. The initial response of the UK Police to the rioting was weak and incompetent. They took considerably long to reclaim the control of the streets and to bring some semblance of order. In the beginning, the deployment of strength was inadequate and their tactics were softer than what the situation required. What happened there was “criminality, pure and simple,” as the British Prime Minister called it. The public complaint against the police, which was also shared by the government, was that “the police response had not been robust enough...” The Home Secretary Theresa May told the British Parliament “…police only retain the confidence of the wider community if they are seen to take clear and robust action in the face of open criminality.” What happened in Mumbai was also a clear exhibition of open criminality and the public in this country also felt that the police handling of riot was too soft to inspire confidence.
The police handling of riots received criticism from many quarters in both the countries. The police response to governments’ reactions in the two countries was, however, significantly different. Unlike what happened in Mumbai, where a police officer was humiliated by his own boss in the presence of the mob and the chief himself was transferred from his post after a few days of the event, the relationship between the police and the political executive in the UK was of a different shade altogether. The president of the Association of Chief Police Officers in the UK, Sir Hugh Orde reacted sharply to the criticism of police handling of riots. He felt that attacks on policing were totally unjustified and negative. He also opposed the Prime Minister’s decision to invite former Los Angles Police Department Chief, Bill Bratton to advise the government on policing in the UK. The government had to drop the idea of inviting an outsider for advice.
Policing of public order in Mumbai on that day does raise the issue of what is meant by the concept of minimum force. Obviously, the senior police officer on the spot has to decide the quantum of force to be used, but the concept of minimum force under no circumstances can be stretched to include releasing an arrested person, who was a member of the riotous crowd and rebuking the officer who had arrested him. This act was too conciliatory to deter the rogue elements in the crowd from committing their depredations, besides producing definite adverse effects on the morale of police officers and men.
Erring on the side of caution may be legitimate tactics but only if it does not lead to emboldening the rioters to commit further and more serious acts of violence and destruction. For some time that day, the rioters did run amok, vandalizing property, burning TV vans, desecrating the Martyrs memorial, injuring citizens including police personnel and molesting police women.
Riot drill teaches the police officers to plan their tactics of dealing with a mob in three stages-the preparatory, action and after action stage. The inept handling of the Mumbai police is seen more at the preparatory than at other stages. It is learnt that intelligence was available with the police that there was a danger of serious disturbance occurring at Azad Maidan on that day. The hooligans came prepared and armed, travelling long distances by trains and other means, but no action was taken to stop them from reaching the trouble spot. Eight hundred police personnel were deployed. The strength might have been adequate, but its composition, that included a large contingent of women police, and its deployment did not inspire confidence. Considering the disruption that occurred, the force was not found to be match fit.
The after action stage should have seen immediate identification and arrest of ring leaders. According to reports, while some louts have been arrested, the organisers, particularly those who incited the crowd to resort to violence, have not been touched.
Such incidents, whenever they occur, are used by the political parties to score brownie points against each other. Protests are launched; assemblies and parliaments are stalled; and demands are made for punishment of police officers and resignation of ministers. The outrage, however, does not last long. Events happen; dreadful noise is made and then after a few days, the dust settles till another incident of lawlessness takes place.
This time, the police must do a root and branch examination of what happened in Mumbai on that day and how the situation was handled to draw some lessons. They must guard against getting “mired in a ‘damned if they do and damned if they don't’ mindset,” which can produce some undesirable consequences for the future of public order policing in the country.
