PIERCING
THE PANCHKULA HAZE- A REJOINDER
The Ideas Page of the Indian
Express dated August 31, 2017 is devoted to putting across the views of two
police officers about what happened in Panchkula on August 25, 2017.While the
senior retired police officer Mr Prakash Singh is of the view that there was a
“terrible failure of leadership in Haryana at all levels-political,
bureaucratic and police,” the serving and comparatively junior police officer Mr Abhinav Kumar seems to think that the blame being
ascribed to Haryana police for their failure to control the violence is unjust. This view is “at best naïve and
ill informed, and at worst maliciously biased. Either way it is wrong”
I read Mr Kumar’s article with
great interest but with greater anguish, because, in my view, the article is heavily
biased in favour of the police.
Why does Mr Kumar feel that to
blame the police entirely for what happened in Panchkula on that fateful day is
wrong. The only argument made is that “in the present scheme of things”, the
decisions on allowing the crowd to assemble and using force to disperse them
are “in the hands of the political executive.” There are two points that need
to be made here. Firstly, what Mr Kumar says is contrary to the law and to all
the instructions contained in the Police manuals. Chapter 10 of the Cr P C on Maintenance of
Public Order and Tranquility does not recognize any authority to disperse an
unlawful assembly other than the police and the magistracy. Panchkula being a Commissionarte of Police,
the responsibility of making preparatory and other arrangements was entirely
that of the police. Secondly, if, in the “present scheme of things” the police
authority to enforce the law of the land has been completely eroded due to
political pressure, the police are as much to blame as the political executive.
However, Mr Kumar further seems to think that the “present scheme of things” is
somewhat reasonable as he suggests that “one cannot easily take away the right
of political executive to make the decision to exercise restraint till the last
moment” In other words, if the political executive decides to exercise
restraint due to political considerations and the crowd turns into a riotous
mob, causing large scale death and destruction, neither the political executive
nor the police are to be blamed. Mr Kumar does not suggest who should be held
accountable in such a situation. How much restraint is to be exercised and how
much force is to be used to ensure that law and order is maintained are the
decisions that, according to law and rules and regulations, are to be taken by
the law enforcement authorities.
Riot drill teaches the police
officers to plan their tactics of dealing with a mob in three stages-the
preparatory, action and after action stage.
The inept handling of the Haryana police is seen more at the preparatory
than at other stages. It is learnt that
intelligence was available that there was a danger of serious disturbance
occurring at Panchkula on that day. The
hooligans came prepared and armed, travelling long distances by trains, buses and
other means, but no action was taken to stop them from reaching the trouble
spot. Nothing can justify the failure of
the police to take preventive action to control the crowd by saying that they
were pressurised by the political executive to do so.
Any censure of police action in
such situations is generally dismissed by police officers as unwarranted
armchair criticism coming from those who did not have to bear the brunt of mob’s
fury in the form of stones and other missiles but who became wise in hindsight
after the police controlled the situation.
This response is so common, but is also so shortsighted, as it deprives
the police of an opportunity to review different incidents to find what went
wrong with their methods and tactics, their training, equipment and command and
control. A review of such incidents
would enable them to learn how to develop a high level of riot control
capability, which would help in reducing the intensity of confrontations and in
managing situations more effectively in future than was done this time. It is
this type of review that needs to be done by the police and not to pass on the
blame to political executive or to other authorities.
The number of security personnel deployed by
the centre was probably more than the number of state police personnel
stationed in Panchkula to control the situation. Despite the Police and Public
Order being State subjects under the Constitution of India, the central
government has taken interest in policing in the country. From
the very beginning, it has focused on raising and expanding its own para
military set up. Most of its expenditure
on Police every year is spent on meeting the requirements of para military
forces. This expenditure has been rising every year. There has been very heavy
deployment of these forces on law and order duties in states. While the state governments have found it
administratively convenient and economically beneficial to let the central
forces handle their serious law and order problems, the availability of central
assistance has unwittingly inhibited the development of their police forces. What is required is to train and develop the state police
forces to become effective enough to deal with such situations on their own.
The
above rejoinder was written in response to an article by Mr Abhinav Kumar, a
serving IPS officer and published in the Indian Express
dated August 31, 2017. Mr. Kumar’s article is reproduced below:
Piercing
the Panchkula Haze
The real tragedy of
Panchkula is not the blame game and turf wars. It is the death of nearly 40
citizens at the hands of the state.
The
last week was not a good time to be a godman in India. It was, however, a worse
time to be a policeman in India. That the police were cowardly, incompetent and
ineffective is a cliché of our times. It can be applied anywhere, most recently
to the violence in Panchkula. So whether one believes that the situation was
saved by the brave woman deputy commissioner of Panchkula, or by the arrival of
the Indian Army, all the different narratives are united in their contempt for
the conduct of the Haryana Police and the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) deployed
with them. Having seen the challenges faced by the Haryana police over the last
week at close quarters, this view is at best naive and ill-informed, and at
worst maliciously biased. Either way, it is quite simply, wrong.
The
police leadership of Haryana is being criticised for allowing a large crowd to
gather in Panchkula in the days preceding the judgment. Within minutes of the
verdict, mob frenzy took over. For nearly an hour, the Dera premis went on the
rampage, burning vehicles, attacking police personnel on duty and damaging
government property. Even the media were not spared. Their reporters were
brutally attacked and their OB vans were burnt. The sky above Panchkula turned
grey with smoke.
The
initial onslaught certainly took the security forces by surprise. Once the
order to disperse the mob by any means necessary was given, the sound of
gunfire rang out and within a few minutes, the mob ran helter-skelter. An hour
of mob fury was followed by an hour of the state displaying its heavy hand. It left
39 persons dead, while scores more were injured.
As
with all such things in our country, politics soon overtook any rational
analysis and debate about what had just happened, largely in Panchkula, but
also in fits and spurts in other parts of Haryana and Punjab. The epicentre of
the Dera, Sirsa, saw six deaths. While Punjab, too, was the scene of some
destruction of property, thankfully there was no loss of life.
Sit
The events of Panchkula undoubtedly pose many
uncomfortable questions for all of us in positions of authority. However, even
before the dust has settled, the blame game and scrambling to take credit based
on individual ambition and institutional turf has begun. One account would have
us believe that but for one brave IAS officer, the ransacking of Panchkula was
imminent. Another would have us believe that all was lost till the army arrived
and saved the bumbling civilian administration yet again. Both narratives are
economical with the truth. The officer was throughout escorted by policemen and
the army did not fire a single shot. This is not to deny them their role in
bringing the violence under control, but only to place it in perspective and
set the record straight. What is more worrying is such simplistic self-serving
narratives find takers in public discourse.
Let’s
be clear on one count. In the present scheme of things, the decision on whether
a large crowd is to be allowed to assemble in the first place, whether
preventive measures are to be taken, or whether a punitive response can take
place only after violence has happened, is in the hands of the political
executive. It is not a decision a chief secretary or a DGP can take on their
own. As for the political executive, over the years, a consensus, cutting
across party lines, has emerged that the political costs of pre-emptive action
are not acceptable. It is to let the administration respond after violence has
taken place and not second guess the intention of an assembled crowd and be
accused of high-handedness. Legally, too, the bar for using deadly force in self-defence
is set much lower than for using it to preempt violence. We can call it
cowardice, incompetence, or collusion. But one cannot easily take away the
right of the political executive to make the decision to exercise restraint
till the last possible moment. This issue requires a more nuanced discussion
and debate.
The
second issue is about the capacity of the state to deal with such crowds. Over
the years, the states of India have simply not invested enough in the police.
As a result, for anything more than a routine, local law and order problem, the
states end up seeking assistance from the Centre. This is usually provided in
the form of CAPFs, and in extreme cases, by the Indian Army. Over the years,
the CAPFs have grown to number nearly a million and provide crucial support to
local police forces in a range of situations. However, other than the CRPF, the
deployment of all other CAPFs comes at the cost of their primary mission and
training. Similarly, the preparedness of the army is also affected by frequent
interventions in civil emergencies. We really need to have a national mission
to build state police capacities. A better-staffed, better-trained and
better-equipped police force with its ear to the ground would be a more
effective bulwark against law and order problems than central forces.
Last
but not the least is the role of the Indian Army in such situations. In the
aftermath of Panchkula, a section of our military veterans took to the media
with uncompromising expressions of contempt and ridicule for civil authorities
and the police. This is not only unfortunate, but also betrays a profound
ignorance about civil-military relations. These self-styled custodians of the
Indian Army seem to exist in a sociological and historical bubble. More worryingly,
they think that military tactics and value systems are the best way to assess
the response of civil authorities in law and order situations. They forget that
the crowds we face are not our enemy, retreating before them and showing
restraint in the face of their violent provocations is not cowardice. Shoot
first ask questions later may be a sound military dictum, but it would be a
poor policing tactic. The army coming to the aid of civilian authority is not a
favour extended by the former to the citizens; it is an integral part of the
charter of duties of any armed forces in a democracy.
The
real tragedy of Panchkula is not the blame game and turf wars. It is the death
of nearly 40 citizens at the hands of the state. They were not demanding the
break-up of India. They were blinded by their faith in a conman, who, perhaps,
gave some sense of meaning and purpose in their life. By all accounts, they
came from the poorest and most marginalised sections of our society. Instead of
chest thumping and finger pointing, it is important we find ways and means to
ensure that such a tragedy is not repeated.
