PARLIAMENT AND JUDICIARY- THE BELLIGERENT RELATIONSHIP
On July17, 2006, a Supreme Court bench headed by the Chief Justice of India censured the central government for enacting the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act 2006, that put a moratorium on demolitions of unauthorized constructions in the capital for one year. The Court felt that the legislation was “wholly void and illegal”, and was “aimed at overruling the orders of the court”
Almost a year ago, on July 31, 2005, the Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee was echoing similar feelings about the authority of legislature. While inaugurating the 69th conference of the presiding officers of legislatives bodies in India, he expressed concern about the eroding independence of legislatures and said this was a challenge the presiding officers must grapple with. The meeting was being held in the backdrop of developments in the Jharkhand legislature The Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act 2006, that provoked such searing observations from the judges, is only one in the series of many such laws passed recently by the government. To give only a few examples, the Office of Profit law was passed with retrospective effect to allow the MPs to retain their offices of profit, disregarding the suggestions even of the President. The Central Vigilance Commission Act of 2003 legalised the Single Directive issued to CBI that was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Havala case. The Court held the Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 unconstitutional but the government decided on February 10, 2006 to set up tribunals under the Foreigners Registration Act, 1946, for determination of illegal migrants in Assam.
It is not only the central but also the state governments that have shown similar belligerence in nullifying the judgements of the courts. The two recent examples have been the Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP) where the Karnataka Government tried to defy both the High court as well as the Supreme Court and block the implementation of the expressway project by the Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise (NICE) and the Ulhasnagar case, where the Maharastra Government promulgated an ordinance to regularize 855 illegal buildings that were being threatened with demolition under the orders of the Bombay High Court.
Seeds of what is happening now were sown long ago. In 1951, the Constitution was amended for the first time. Article 31 B was introduced to provide immunity to certain Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule to the Indian Constitution from being challenged even if it involved infringement of fundamental rights. The courts were deprived of the power to declare such legislation void. In the beginning, the Schedule consisted of mere 13 items, but now it has as many as 284 laws, with more than 35Acts added during the two years of emergency.
There are some differences between what occurred during the earlier years and what is happening now. One, the stature of members of the legislature in those days was generally much higher than what it is now. There was a galaxy of luminaries in the Parliament during Prime Minister Nehru’s days, who enjoyed public trust. Now the Parliament pales in comparison, with steep decline not only in the standards of debate but also of integrity and honesty of members, with many of them having past criminal records. Criminalisation of politics has led to an enormous loss of people’s confidence in the legislature. A similar loss of faith in the integrity and independence of the judiciary has not occurred, though charges of corruption against even the upper judiciary are occasionally heard. Two, when the legislature enacted laws to undermine or restrict the court’s jurisdiction and powers, action was guided more by public than private or partisan interests. Article 31 B went to the extent of even denying primacy to fundamental rights in the interests of protecting land and agriculture related legislation that was considered highly important from economic and social welfare point of view. Presently, it is mostly the partisan and selfish considerations and false notions of asserting ones supremacy that govern new legislation enacted to invalidate judicial verdicts. Whether it is the legislation preventing the demolition of buildings or allowing its members to enjoy the perks of two or more offices or giving impunity to officers of the rank of Joint Secretary and above from being inquired into in corruption cases or preventing large scale migration from the neighboring country, it is either the selfish considerations of vote bank politics, consolidating party’s power or even of protecting ones lackeys or distributing patronage that has shaped such decisions.
it is the job of the legislature to enact laws, it is for the judiciary to review and interpret them to ensure they are in accordance with the Constitutional provisions. So if the Court declares any law as null and void, any subsequent law passed by the legislature to set aside the impact of the judgement can not be upheld unless it meets the same constitutional or legal norms or standards, the absence of which led to throwing out the earlier law. This must be realized by the legislature; otherwise the rewriting of laws will continue to occur, leading to unnecessary wastage of public resources
In the final analysis, what is happening is more a confrontation between the executive and judiciary rather than the one between the legislature and judiciary. The doctrine of “separation of powers” is based on a clear-cut division of powers between the three arms of governance- executive, legislature and judiciary, where each one acts as a check on the others. In the west minister model of parliamentary democracy that we have adopted, the separation of power is not all that clear. The cabinet that heads the executive is drawn from the legislature. What the legislature passes as laws is what the executive wants them to do and the executive may occasionally be guided by protecting the interests of the party in power. Public interests may not always reign supreme.
Which is sovereign- parliament or judiciary? It is a superficial and hollow question that should never be raised or discussed. All institutions of governance owe their existence and powers to that supreme document- the Constitution of India. One sovereign truth must be realized by all-“Howsoever high you may be, the Constitution is above you.” This is the only way to preserve democracy in this country.
Wednesday, August 2, 2006
Tuesday, May 30, 2006
A LAW TO LEGALISE THE ILLEGAL
LAW BREAKERS AND LAW MAKERS
Oliver Goldsmith once said: “ The English laws punish vice; the Chinese laws do more, they reward virtue.” Looking at the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006, it appears that the Indian laws do much more- they reward vice by legalising the violations of law committed with impunity by all concerned- the public, the building mafia, the local authorities and the politicians.
The Government of India was in an unseemly hurry in legislating and passing this Act. It was exempted from the mandatory seven-day notice for consideration. The Act is poorly drafted. Look at the title of the legislation itself- “The Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006.” It talks of special provisions about the Delhi laws, but what are these laws about which special provisions are being made? The title gives no idea about the purpose of legislation. It appears that the government was somewhat diffident to convey through the title that it was trying to prevent demolitions of unauthorized constructions ordered by the courts in Delhi. The Act, in fact, does not use the term “unauthorized constructions”; instead it prefers the phrase “unauthorised development” and defines it to cover the constructions and use of buildings and land in contravention of the sanctioned plans, including encroachment.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons with which the Bill was introduced tries to put considerable gloss over it. The Bill is necessary to enable the government to take all possible measures for the “finalisation of norms, policy guidelines and feasible strategies” to deal with the problems of unauthorized constructions so that, as Section 3 of the Act says, the “development of Delhi can take place in a sustainable and planned manner.” Section 3 gives one year to the government to frame the policies and prescribes that “status quo as on the 1st day of January, 2006 shall be maintained in respect of categories of unauthorized development” mentioned in the Act. This means that no punitive action shall be taken during this period in respect of unauthorized constructions or encroachments that had not been demolished till December 31, 2005.
This law raises more questions than it answers. The problem of illegal constructions and encroachments is not a new one; it has been in Delhi for many years. Why should the government require one year now to design strategies to deal with the problem, when they have not been able to do it for so many years and why should they need a law to do so?
Laws relating to unauthorized constructions or their demolitions have been applied randomly and unequally right from the beginning. These matters in Delhi are regulated as per the provisions of the Unified Building Bye-laws, 1983, which are implemented by local bodies in their respective areas. The fact that the local authorities either did not enforce the bye-laws or overlooked their violations is obvious from the large scale sealing of illegal properties and their demolitions that had to take place under the orders of the courts. Shri Jaipal Reddy, the Union Urban Development Minister admitted in the Lok Sabha on March 6, 2006 that “the extent and magnitude of violations of unauthorized construction and misuse of premises is assessed to be huge and the number of families likely to be affected may be in lakhs..” Obviously, all this did not happen overnight. Why didn’t the government wake up and take action in time? The CPI member Gurudas Dasgupta’s observation that the demolition issue had come to such a sorry pass because of persistent political connivance and corruption may be a part of the explanation.
Even when the demolitions were going on, the courts had to direct the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and other local bodies on many occasions not to adopt the 'pick and choose' policy and initiate action against the 'big fish,' which had violated the building laws with impunity.
The present law adds to the list of laws that are “badly written and randomly enforced” Selecting the cut off date as January 1, 2006 to prevent further demolitions would always invoke peculiar feelings amongst a large number of people whose unauthorized constructions or encroachments unluckily and untimely came under the axe. According to Mr. Vijay Kumar Malhotra’s statement in the Lok Sabha, 40,000 shops and 20,000 houses had been brought down in the past few months.
The central government was not alone in formulating a law to regularize violations of law. The Maharastra Government had done it earlier, promulgating an ordinance to regularize 855 illegal buildings in Ulhasnagar that were being threatened with demolition under the orders of the Bombay High Court.
The politicians showed considerable solidarity in passing the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Bill, 2006 to prevent demolitions. The Bill was passed unanimously with both the treasury and opposition benches supporting it.
Why were the politicians so keen to stop demolitions? Was it because of their concern for the hardships caused to the public? Those who know our politicians explain it differently. They passed this law because many of them had their own illegal buildings and encroachments to protect. In addition, this was too good a cause to miss in terms of vote bank politics.
“The illegal we do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer”, Henry Kissinger had said in a different context. Our politicians can surely do both in quick time.
(Original version of an article published in the Indian Express dated May 30, 2006)
Oliver Goldsmith once said: “ The English laws punish vice; the Chinese laws do more, they reward virtue.” Looking at the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006, it appears that the Indian laws do much more- they reward vice by legalising the violations of law committed with impunity by all concerned- the public, the building mafia, the local authorities and the politicians.
The Government of India was in an unseemly hurry in legislating and passing this Act. It was exempted from the mandatory seven-day notice for consideration. The Act is poorly drafted. Look at the title of the legislation itself- “The Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006.” It talks of special provisions about the Delhi laws, but what are these laws about which special provisions are being made? The title gives no idea about the purpose of legislation. It appears that the government was somewhat diffident to convey through the title that it was trying to prevent demolitions of unauthorized constructions ordered by the courts in Delhi. The Act, in fact, does not use the term “unauthorized constructions”; instead it prefers the phrase “unauthorised development” and defines it to cover the constructions and use of buildings and land in contravention of the sanctioned plans, including encroachment.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons with which the Bill was introduced tries to put considerable gloss over it. The Bill is necessary to enable the government to take all possible measures for the “finalisation of norms, policy guidelines and feasible strategies” to deal with the problems of unauthorized constructions so that, as Section 3 of the Act says, the “development of Delhi can take place in a sustainable and planned manner.” Section 3 gives one year to the government to frame the policies and prescribes that “status quo as on the 1st day of January, 2006 shall be maintained in respect of categories of unauthorized development” mentioned in the Act. This means that no punitive action shall be taken during this period in respect of unauthorized constructions or encroachments that had not been demolished till December 31, 2005.
This law raises more questions than it answers. The problem of illegal constructions and encroachments is not a new one; it has been in Delhi for many years. Why should the government require one year now to design strategies to deal with the problem, when they have not been able to do it for so many years and why should they need a law to do so?
Laws relating to unauthorized constructions or their demolitions have been applied randomly and unequally right from the beginning. These matters in Delhi are regulated as per the provisions of the Unified Building Bye-laws, 1983, which are implemented by local bodies in their respective areas. The fact that the local authorities either did not enforce the bye-laws or overlooked their violations is obvious from the large scale sealing of illegal properties and their demolitions that had to take place under the orders of the courts. Shri Jaipal Reddy, the Union Urban Development Minister admitted in the Lok Sabha on March 6, 2006 that “the extent and magnitude of violations of unauthorized construction and misuse of premises is assessed to be huge and the number of families likely to be affected may be in lakhs..” Obviously, all this did not happen overnight. Why didn’t the government wake up and take action in time? The CPI member Gurudas Dasgupta’s observation that the demolition issue had come to such a sorry pass because of persistent political connivance and corruption may be a part of the explanation.
Even when the demolitions were going on, the courts had to direct the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and other local bodies on many occasions not to adopt the 'pick and choose' policy and initiate action against the 'big fish,' which had violated the building laws with impunity.
The present law adds to the list of laws that are “badly written and randomly enforced” Selecting the cut off date as January 1, 2006 to prevent further demolitions would always invoke peculiar feelings amongst a large number of people whose unauthorized constructions or encroachments unluckily and untimely came under the axe. According to Mr. Vijay Kumar Malhotra’s statement in the Lok Sabha, 40,000 shops and 20,000 houses had been brought down in the past few months.
The central government was not alone in formulating a law to regularize violations of law. The Maharastra Government had done it earlier, promulgating an ordinance to regularize 855 illegal buildings in Ulhasnagar that were being threatened with demolition under the orders of the Bombay High Court.
The politicians showed considerable solidarity in passing the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Bill, 2006 to prevent demolitions. The Bill was passed unanimously with both the treasury and opposition benches supporting it.
Why were the politicians so keen to stop demolitions? Was it because of their concern for the hardships caused to the public? Those who know our politicians explain it differently. They passed this law because many of them had their own illegal buildings and encroachments to protect. In addition, this was too good a cause to miss in terms of vote bank politics.
“The illegal we do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer”, Henry Kissinger had said in a different context. Our politicians can surely do both in quick time.
(Original version of an article published in the Indian Express dated May 30, 2006)
Friday, January 13, 2006
POLICING AND GOVERNANCE
BETTER POLICING FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE
The subject for panel discussion this evening is Better Policing for Good Governance. The idea seems to be that you have to improve your policing if you want to establish good governance. Somebody may dispute this assumption by asserting that you have to have good governance if you want to better your policing. This in fact shows how closely connected the two are and I presume that we will be discussing this subject in the context of a democratic society.
There are two major challenges to governance in this country:
1. Ensuring sustained development of the economy at a brisk pace and
2. providing a sense of security to the public by controlling crime and violence in society.
The two, in fact, are closely linked. A developing economy requires a climate of peace and stability.
This has become particularly important in view of the increasing globalisation and spread of the market forces across the national boundaries. It is important to realise that if development has to take place, crime must be controlled and order must be maintained.
Every civilized society requires to control crime and maintain order if it has to survive; but a democratic society for its survival requires something in addition. It needs for its survival the preservation of citizens rights. Good policing is thus essential not only for economic development, but also for the survival of our democratic system.
It has not yet been realised in this country that this 7 or 10 % growth rate about which we are talking so loudly and the democratic freedoms that we cherish so proudly will not last if we do not establish a system of good policing.
But what is good policing? Good policing in a democratic society is one where the police are professional enough to perform their core functions efficiently and effectively and are sensitive enough to see that they do their duty while respecting human dignity and maintaining citizens rights.
It is the same old perennial problem of maintaining collective security while preserving individual rights. The secret of good policing lies in balancing these requirements and this balancing can be done if we try to reorganise our system on the principles of democratic policing. What are these principles?
One basic principle is that the police should be subject to rule of law and not to the wishes of a person or party in power. In other words, it is very important that the police are controlled and governed to ensure that they work according to what the law and constitution of the country demands. A history of policing in this country shows that the type of control that has been exercised over the police has led to (a) undermining the rule of law and (b) obstructing the growth of a professionally sound system of policing in the country.
One way of dealing with the problem is to make institutional arrangements that provide functional autonomy to the police but simultaneously make them more accountable. The NPC had made many recommendations to ensure this, including the establishment of the State Security Commission (SSC), prescribing a procedure for selection of the head of police, giving him a fixed secure tenure and prescribing rules for transfer and laying down that any transfer done arbitrarily to be treated as null and void. The Padmanabhaiah Committee also placed considerable stress on having a proper tenure and transfer policy for police officers.
The idea of setting up a SSC has not been found acceptable. Can we do something else to achieve the results if SSC is not set up. I would like to introduce a few points to seek your suggestions:
Can we define superintendence in clear terms to say that superintendence is to be exercised in accordance with law and in public interest?
Can we make a distinction between policy formulation and operational directions? I would suggest a distinction to be made between the police as an organization and policing as a set of functions and activities. While the police as an organization should be the responsibility of the government policing as a set of activities should be the responsibility of the chief of police. This would mean that the government’s role is to formulate policies, set standards, monitor performance and provide the money and other resources required for a good police system and not to give operational directions.
Define the roles and responsibilities of different agencies controlling the police. There are three main agencies that control the police- the government, the community and the police themselves. If the law can define the roles of each in clear terms, a part of the problem will be over. .
Establish a system of checks and balances by making consultation amongst different agencies mandatory.
The first principle that has been discussed so far requires the police to be an instrument of rule of law. Being subject to the rule of law also means that the police cannot be a law unto themselves. What the police in this country have not been able to appreciate is that there are limits to their powers- limits imposed by the constitution, law and their own manuals. It is becoming difficult to control police behaviour for many reasons. Some of these are:
1.Criminality in the police has registered considerable increase over a period of time. This was one of the findings of the Pad Committee. The Vohra Committee had also mentioned this. It is not merely misuse of power, but downright criminal acts which have been committed. Nexus between the wrong policeman and dishonest politician results in providing impunity
2.Disciplinary mechanisms have become weak because of the erosion of authority of the departmental hierarchy
3 There has been considerable slackening of the standards of recruitment and appointments due to fast expansion, corruption and favouritism,
Another important principle of democratic policing is that the police must be neutral and non discriminatory. It must protect democratic freedoms of all. How do you ensure this in a highly heterogeneous society?. It has been suggested that the police must be representative of the community it serves. Every effort should be made to get minority people to join the force, but should reservation be made in recruitment on caste and communal basis? The NPC was against this.
One of the most important requirements of democratic policing is to make the police accountable to multiple agencies for improving their performance and behaviour. The PM has suggested the establishment of a Police Performance Evaluation Board and a Police Complaints Authority.
There are two other points that I would like to make. One is about modernisation. Modernisation has been interpreted in terms of equipment- providing the police with all that technology can offer. The modernization grant is now is about Rs 1000 crores. There is no doubt that police must be equipped adequately. But along with the modernization of equipment, modernization of attitudes is very important. Unless the attitudes change, a highly modernized police force need not be a better police force. It may prove to be an oppressive force. How do you modernise the attitudes? If training is the answer, are we doing enough on that front? The BPR&D’s figures show that not even 2% of police budget is being spent on training.
Technology may make police more efficient. However there is no necessary guarantee that the enhancements of police power offered by new technologies will be used to protect, rather than to undermine democracy, particularly when this can happen so silently and effortlessly. We have of course not reached that stage as yet but some signs of this happening are visible in the wiretapping incident.
The other important point for better policing is the need to restructure the police force Restructure it from the point of view of improving the career prospects of lower ranks. The entire structure and philosophy of police organization are loaded highly against the lower ranks. Till the structure is altered and philosophy is changed and the conditions of the lower ranks who constitute 99% of the force are improved, the police can not become a means of good governance.
The subject for panel discussion this evening is Better Policing for Good Governance. The idea seems to be that you have to improve your policing if you want to establish good governance. Somebody may dispute this assumption by asserting that you have to have good governance if you want to better your policing. This in fact shows how closely connected the two are and I presume that we will be discussing this subject in the context of a democratic society.
There are two major challenges to governance in this country:
1. Ensuring sustained development of the economy at a brisk pace and
2. providing a sense of security to the public by controlling crime and violence in society.
The two, in fact, are closely linked. A developing economy requires a climate of peace and stability.
This has become particularly important in view of the increasing globalisation and spread of the market forces across the national boundaries. It is important to realise that if development has to take place, crime must be controlled and order must be maintained.
Every civilized society requires to control crime and maintain order if it has to survive; but a democratic society for its survival requires something in addition. It needs for its survival the preservation of citizens rights. Good policing is thus essential not only for economic development, but also for the survival of our democratic system.
It has not yet been realised in this country that this 7 or 10 % growth rate about which we are talking so loudly and the democratic freedoms that we cherish so proudly will not last if we do not establish a system of good policing.
But what is good policing? Good policing in a democratic society is one where the police are professional enough to perform their core functions efficiently and effectively and are sensitive enough to see that they do their duty while respecting human dignity and maintaining citizens rights.
It is the same old perennial problem of maintaining collective security while preserving individual rights. The secret of good policing lies in balancing these requirements and this balancing can be done if we try to reorganise our system on the principles of democratic policing. What are these principles?
One basic principle is that the police should be subject to rule of law and not to the wishes of a person or party in power. In other words, it is very important that the police are controlled and governed to ensure that they work according to what the law and constitution of the country demands. A history of policing in this country shows that the type of control that has been exercised over the police has led to (a) undermining the rule of law and (b) obstructing the growth of a professionally sound system of policing in the country.
One way of dealing with the problem is to make institutional arrangements that provide functional autonomy to the police but simultaneously make them more accountable. The NPC had made many recommendations to ensure this, including the establishment of the State Security Commission (SSC), prescribing a procedure for selection of the head of police, giving him a fixed secure tenure and prescribing rules for transfer and laying down that any transfer done arbitrarily to be treated as null and void. The Padmanabhaiah Committee also placed considerable stress on having a proper tenure and transfer policy for police officers.
The idea of setting up a SSC has not been found acceptable. Can we do something else to achieve the results if SSC is not set up. I would like to introduce a few points to seek your suggestions:
Can we define superintendence in clear terms to say that superintendence is to be exercised in accordance with law and in public interest?
Can we make a distinction between policy formulation and operational directions? I would suggest a distinction to be made between the police as an organization and policing as a set of functions and activities. While the police as an organization should be the responsibility of the government policing as a set of activities should be the responsibility of the chief of police. This would mean that the government’s role is to formulate policies, set standards, monitor performance and provide the money and other resources required for a good police system and not to give operational directions.
Define the roles and responsibilities of different agencies controlling the police. There are three main agencies that control the police- the government, the community and the police themselves. If the law can define the roles of each in clear terms, a part of the problem will be over. .
Establish a system of checks and balances by making consultation amongst different agencies mandatory.
The first principle that has been discussed so far requires the police to be an instrument of rule of law. Being subject to the rule of law also means that the police cannot be a law unto themselves. What the police in this country have not been able to appreciate is that there are limits to their powers- limits imposed by the constitution, law and their own manuals. It is becoming difficult to control police behaviour for many reasons. Some of these are:
1.Criminality in the police has registered considerable increase over a period of time. This was one of the findings of the Pad Committee. The Vohra Committee had also mentioned this. It is not merely misuse of power, but downright criminal acts which have been committed. Nexus between the wrong policeman and dishonest politician results in providing impunity
2.Disciplinary mechanisms have become weak because of the erosion of authority of the departmental hierarchy
3 There has been considerable slackening of the standards of recruitment and appointments due to fast expansion, corruption and favouritism,
Another important principle of democratic policing is that the police must be neutral and non discriminatory. It must protect democratic freedoms of all. How do you ensure this in a highly heterogeneous society?. It has been suggested that the police must be representative of the community it serves. Every effort should be made to get minority people to join the force, but should reservation be made in recruitment on caste and communal basis? The NPC was against this.
One of the most important requirements of democratic policing is to make the police accountable to multiple agencies for improving their performance and behaviour. The PM has suggested the establishment of a Police Performance Evaluation Board and a Police Complaints Authority.
There are two other points that I would like to make. One is about modernisation. Modernisation has been interpreted in terms of equipment- providing the police with all that technology can offer. The modernization grant is now is about Rs 1000 crores. There is no doubt that police must be equipped adequately. But along with the modernization of equipment, modernization of attitudes is very important. Unless the attitudes change, a highly modernized police force need not be a better police force. It may prove to be an oppressive force. How do you modernise the attitudes? If training is the answer, are we doing enough on that front? The BPR&D’s figures show that not even 2% of police budget is being spent on training.
Technology may make police more efficient. However there is no necessary guarantee that the enhancements of police power offered by new technologies will be used to protect, rather than to undermine democracy, particularly when this can happen so silently and effortlessly. We have of course not reached that stage as yet but some signs of this happening are visible in the wiretapping incident.
The other important point for better policing is the need to restructure the police force Restructure it from the point of view of improving the career prospects of lower ranks. The entire structure and philosophy of police organization are loaded highly against the lower ranks. Till the structure is altered and philosophy is changed and the conditions of the lower ranks who constitute 99% of the force are improved, the police can not become a means of good governance.
Saturday, November 19, 2005
NEED TO EVALUATE POLICE PERFORMANCE
POLICE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD
While addressing the first ever conference of district superintendents of police organised by the central government on September 1, 2005 in New Delhi, the Prime Minister stressed the need to establish a Police Performance Board.
Why is a police performance board needed?
Crime is rising fast all over the world and our country is no exception. Violent disorders in different forms, including terrorism, are occurring with regular frequency in different parts of the country. How are the police forces tackling these problems? How do they interact with citizens? What are the problems they face and constraints under which they work? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
The government as well as the public must know what their police service is doing and how it is performing. The public must know this so that they can exercise influence over the way they are policed and can see that effective systems are in place to make the police answer for their actions. The government must know how the police is doing so that they can take necessary action to improve its functioning.
Presently, the government depends mostly on what their police force tells them about their performance and the problems. Added to these are the assessment reports that the government receives occasionally from their civil administrative machinery functioning at the district and division and secretariat levels.
The main problem with these reports is that they do not provide the government an unbiased assessment of how the police have performed and the factors that have affected the performance. The attempt is often to glorify the achievements or magnify the problems or cover up failures.
What is therefore needed is to set up a Directorate of Police Monitoring and Evaluation independent of the government and the police organisation.
What are the main benefits of an independent police performance board?
1 The independent inspection reports would help in monitoring the performance of the police force, identifying the areas of weaknesses and shortcomings and ensuring that standards are maintained.
2. The Board can function like a watchdog and exercise oversight on how the police performs.
3. Since the Board has the specialised knowledge, it will provide to the government a means of getting an independent, objective and professional assessment on the working of the police force in the state and enable it to take measures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police force.
4. It will also provide to the head of the police force an independent assessment by experts who are not involved in the operations.
5. The Board can assess the results of particular programs, experiments and initiatives undertaken to improve the delivery of services
6. The independent assessment done by the board can provide a sound base for doing a more rational allocation of police resources
Recommendations of expert bodies
The need to establish police performance board has been made by various expert committees and commissions.
The National Police Commission recommended three different institutions- one to monitor performance of the criminal justice system and the others to evaluate the performance of the police force.
The NPC in its second report recommended the establishment of a Criminal Justice Commission. The Commission felt that the police would not achieve success in their work unless all wings of the criminal justice system operated with simultaneous efficiency. It was therefore necessary to set up a body, which would comprehensively monitor the performance of all agencies and apply corrective measures from time to time. They recommended further that such arrangements at the centre should be supported with similar arrangements at the state level.
In its second report, the NPC also recommended the establishment of a state security commission (SSC) to help the state government discharge their superintending responsibility over the police in an open manner so as to ensure that the police work within and under the framework of law. One of the important functions in the charter prescribed by the Commission for the state security commission was to evaluate the performance of the state police force every year and present a report to the state legislature.
In its eighth report, the Commission further recommended that the SSC should have an independent cell to evaluate police performance. In its eight report, the Commission recommended the draft of a model Police Bill and this contained provisions recommending the establishment of a Directorate of Inspection to evaluate the performance of the police forces and report thereon to the state security commission. In addition to its annual inspection report, the directorate would carry out such other duties for furthering police efficiency as the state security commission might direct.
The Padmanabahaiah Committee in their report on Police Reforms (August 2002) recommended the establishment of an Independent Inspectorate of Police to ensure that the police functioned in an efficient and effective manner. The Commission felt that this would work as an effective accountability mechanism.
Do such boards exist in other countries?
Yes, they do. Different types of boards and commissions have been set up in foreign countries with different charters. So far as monitoring and evaluation of police performance is concerned, one would like to refer here to only two such institutions - the oldest and the youngest. These are Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in the UK and the Police Board in Ireland.
Her Majesty’s Inspectors were appointed for the first time under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. They have thus been in existence for about a century and a half. The duties of HMIs are laid down in the UK Police Act of 1996. Their main duties are two:
1. Inspect and report to the Secretary of State on the efficiency and effectiveness of every police force.
2. Carry out such other duties as for the purpose of furthering police efficiency and effectiveness as the Secretary of State may from time to time direct.
In addition to annual inspections of the police forces, HMIC does the thematic inspections where it deals with a single theme across many police forces. Both the annual and thematic reports are sent to the police chief for his comments and are published with his comments and laid by the government before the Parliament.
Until recently, the Inspectorate used to depend solely on senior police officers for its staff requirements. In October 1993, two Inspectors were appointed from non- police backgrounds to give representation to the ‘lay element’ in accordance with the Citizen's Charter principle.
The Northern Ireland Policing Board was set up by the Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000. The Board is an independent public body made up of nineteen members. Ten of them are members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and nine are independent members appointed through open competition. The posts are advertised in local papers and then the people who apply are interviewed. All appointments are made by the Secretary of State.
The broad objective of the Board is to secure for all the people of Northern Ireland an effective, efficient and impartial police service, which has the confidence of the whole community.
The Board has a comprehensive charter that monitors police performance not merely for ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation but also to see that the police do not violate human rights of citizens. Some major duties assigned to the Board are:
Does any police performance board exist in India?
No, not now. A Police Performance and Accountability Commission was set up by the Government of Kerala on 18.11.2003 by issuing an executive order. Its charter had a two fold terms of reference:
The Commission consisted of justice K. T Thomas, former judge of the Supreme Court, as the chairman with Mr K.V. Rajgopalan Nair, IPS (retd) and Shri T,N.Jayacahndran, IAS (retd) as members
The tenure of the commission lasted till March 31, 2005. The Commission produced only one report at the end of its tenure. This Commission did not do any periodic evaluation of the police force. It did only one and the final evaluation at the time its tenure ended. It was not a permanent standing arrangement and thus did not provide either to the police force or the government continuous feedback on police performance and steps needed to improve policing.
What type of police board is needed?
The composition and charter of the Board must be guided by the following principles:
Independent- In its functioning, the Board must be independent of thegovernment and the police
Open- The Board must function in an open manner. It must keep the publicinformed about its work and be open to the suggestions received fromdifferent sources.
Objective- Its evaluation of police performance must be objective, based on
standards formulated and objective plans and policies with indicators of measurement prepared beforehand.
Legal base- The Board must be established on a statutory basis so that it functions as an effective monitoring and evaluating agency.
Expertise- It must have multi disciplinary expertise. Besides the police persons, it must have representation of lay element so that civic oversight of per
While addressing the first ever conference of district superintendents of police organised by the central government on September 1, 2005 in New Delhi, the Prime Minister stressed the need to establish a Police Performance Board.
Why is a police performance board needed?
Crime is rising fast all over the world and our country is no exception. Violent disorders in different forms, including terrorism, are occurring with regular frequency in different parts of the country. How are the police forces tackling these problems? How do they interact with citizens? What are the problems they face and constraints under which they work? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
The government as well as the public must know what their police service is doing and how it is performing. The public must know this so that they can exercise influence over the way they are policed and can see that effective systems are in place to make the police answer for their actions. The government must know how the police is doing so that they can take necessary action to improve its functioning.
Presently, the government depends mostly on what their police force tells them about their performance and the problems. Added to these are the assessment reports that the government receives occasionally from their civil administrative machinery functioning at the district and division and secretariat levels.
The main problem with these reports is that they do not provide the government an unbiased assessment of how the police have performed and the factors that have affected the performance. The attempt is often to glorify the achievements or magnify the problems or cover up failures.
What is therefore needed is to set up a Directorate of Police Monitoring and Evaluation independent of the government and the police organisation.
What are the main benefits of an independent police performance board?
1 The independent inspection reports would help in monitoring the performance of the police force, identifying the areas of weaknesses and shortcomings and ensuring that standards are maintained.
2. The Board can function like a watchdog and exercise oversight on how the police performs.
3. Since the Board has the specialised knowledge, it will provide to the government a means of getting an independent, objective and professional assessment on the working of the police force in the state and enable it to take measures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police force.
4. It will also provide to the head of the police force an independent assessment by experts who are not involved in the operations.
5. The Board can assess the results of particular programs, experiments and initiatives undertaken to improve the delivery of services
6. The independent assessment done by the board can provide a sound base for doing a more rational allocation of police resources
Recommendations of expert bodies
The need to establish police performance board has been made by various expert committees and commissions.
The National Police Commission recommended three different institutions- one to monitor performance of the criminal justice system and the others to evaluate the performance of the police force.
The NPC in its second report recommended the establishment of a Criminal Justice Commission. The Commission felt that the police would not achieve success in their work unless all wings of the criminal justice system operated with simultaneous efficiency. It was therefore necessary to set up a body, which would comprehensively monitor the performance of all agencies and apply corrective measures from time to time. They recommended further that such arrangements at the centre should be supported with similar arrangements at the state level.
In its second report, the NPC also recommended the establishment of a state security commission (SSC) to help the state government discharge their superintending responsibility over the police in an open manner so as to ensure that the police work within and under the framework of law. One of the important functions in the charter prescribed by the Commission for the state security commission was to evaluate the performance of the state police force every year and present a report to the state legislature.
In its eighth report, the Commission further recommended that the SSC should have an independent cell to evaluate police performance. In its eight report, the Commission recommended the draft of a model Police Bill and this contained provisions recommending the establishment of a Directorate of Inspection to evaluate the performance of the police forces and report thereon to the state security commission. In addition to its annual inspection report, the directorate would carry out such other duties for furthering police efficiency as the state security commission might direct.
The Padmanabahaiah Committee in their report on Police Reforms (August 2002) recommended the establishment of an Independent Inspectorate of Police to ensure that the police functioned in an efficient and effective manner. The Commission felt that this would work as an effective accountability mechanism.
Do such boards exist in other countries?
Yes, they do. Different types of boards and commissions have been set up in foreign countries with different charters. So far as monitoring and evaluation of police performance is concerned, one would like to refer here to only two such institutions - the oldest and the youngest. These are Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in the UK and the Police Board in Ireland.
Her Majesty’s Inspectors were appointed for the first time under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. They have thus been in existence for about a century and a half. The duties of HMIs are laid down in the UK Police Act of 1996. Their main duties are two:
1. Inspect and report to the Secretary of State on the efficiency and effectiveness of every police force.
2. Carry out such other duties as for the purpose of furthering police efficiency and effectiveness as the Secretary of State may from time to time direct.
In addition to annual inspections of the police forces, HMIC does the thematic inspections where it deals with a single theme across many police forces. Both the annual and thematic reports are sent to the police chief for his comments and are published with his comments and laid by the government before the Parliament.
Until recently, the Inspectorate used to depend solely on senior police officers for its staff requirements. In October 1993, two Inspectors were appointed from non- police backgrounds to give representation to the ‘lay element’ in accordance with the Citizen's Charter principle.
The Northern Ireland Policing Board was set up by the Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000. The Board is an independent public body made up of nineteen members. Ten of them are members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and nine are independent members appointed through open competition. The posts are advertised in local papers and then the people who apply are interviewed. All appointments are made by the Secretary of State.
The broad objective of the Board is to secure for all the people of Northern Ireland an effective, efficient and impartial police service, which has the confidence of the whole community.
The Board has a comprehensive charter that monitors police performance not merely for ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation but also to see that the police do not violate human rights of citizens. Some major duties assigned to the Board are:
- To hold the Chief Constable to account for all his actions and those of his staff.
- To Set objectives and targets for police performance
- To Monitor progress against these
- To monitor trends and patterns in crimes
- To monitor if the police act in line with the Human Rights Act 1998.
- To oversee the workings of the internal police complaints and discipline system.
- To review the trends and patterns in recruitment to the Police Service and the progress made in recruiting women and people from different religious backgrounds.
- To negotiate with the Government to secure the annual policing budget and monitor how the Chief Constable manages this money.
Does any police performance board exist in India?
No, not now. A Police Performance and Accountability Commission was set up by the Government of Kerala on 18.11.2003 by issuing an executive order. Its charter had a two fold terms of reference:
- To evaluate the general performance of the police during the years 2002 and 2003 and make periodic recommendations on improving the functioning of the police.
- To examine the effectiveness of the autonomy given to the police in recent times, its merits and demerits and to suggest measures for further improving the functioning and accountability of the police.
The Commission consisted of justice K. T Thomas, former judge of the Supreme Court, as the chairman with Mr K.V. Rajgopalan Nair, IPS (retd) and Shri T,N.Jayacahndran, IAS (retd) as members
The tenure of the commission lasted till March 31, 2005. The Commission produced only one report at the end of its tenure. This Commission did not do any periodic evaluation of the police force. It did only one and the final evaluation at the time its tenure ended. It was not a permanent standing arrangement and thus did not provide either to the police force or the government continuous feedback on police performance and steps needed to improve policing.
What type of police board is needed?
The composition and charter of the Board must be guided by the following principles:
Independent- In its functioning, the Board must be independent of thegovernment and the police
Open- The Board must function in an open manner. It must keep the publicinformed about its work and be open to the suggestions received fromdifferent sources.
Objective- Its evaluation of police performance must be objective, based on
standards formulated and objective plans and policies with indicators of measurement prepared beforehand.
Legal base- The Board must be established on a statutory basis so that it functions as an effective monitoring and evaluating agency.
Expertise- It must have multi disciplinary expertise. Besides the police persons, it must have representation of lay element so that civic oversight of per
Sunday, October 16, 2005
SECURITY OF TENURE OF POLICE OFFICERS
A SECURE MINIMUM TENURE FOR DISTRICT CHIEFS
During the daytime, the Prime Minister tells the district magistrates of the country in a meeting held on May 15, 2005 that they must have a fixed tenure of posting. By evening the same day, the news comes that the District Magistrates of Siwan and Gopalganj, who had ordered externment of the two RJD MPs Mohammad Shabuddin and Anirudh Singh out of their districts, were transferred by the Governor of Bihar, allegedly at the behest of the Railway Minister, Lalu Prasad Yadav. It, therefore, didn’t come as a surprise when the PM’s address to the Chief Ministers reiterating the same suggestion during the 51st session of the National Development Council on June 27 in New Delhi, fell somewhat flat. More chief ministers opposed than accepted the idea
The Prime Minister suggested to the chief ministers that officials should be entitled to a minimum security of tenure so that they could be judged whether they were equal to the tasks assigned to them. He is obviously interested in reforming the civil administration, but he knows that it is not merely the babus who have weakened the steel frame, but also the politicians. That is why in his address to the district magistrates he said that all was not well with the way the political system was functioning: “Many a time, politics becomes an instrument of self-aggrandisement and ceases to be an instrument of social change.”
Unfortunately, this is happening frequently and one instrument of self-aggrandisment that the politicians have been using with impunity for long is the power of transfers and postings. The blatant and persistent abuse of this power has become what the Hon’ble justice M Katju of Allahabad High Court in his judgement in Civil Miscellaneous Writ petition No. 27123 of 1996 rightly called a “pernicious virus” that has crept into the governance. This virus has particularly affected the district administration badly. . A study of postings of IPS officers in the districts of UP during the year 2004 shows that as many as 153 officers headed the police forces in 70 districts during the year at an average of about 2.2 per district. Four Superintendents of Police headed each of the district police forces in Kushinagar, Jalaun, Mainpuri, Ferozabad and Baghpat and 17 districts saw at least three officers heading each of their police forces during the year. In other words, an officer joins the district and remains there on an average for 3 or 4 months in a year before the new man comes to take over from him. Mr. Madhav Godbole, the former Union Home Secretary, calls this policy “a transfer mela” that “gets converted into a wholesale market where posts often go to the highest bidder.” Justice Katju said more or less the same thing when he observed in the above-mentioned judgement: “It is regrettable that in this State (and perhaps in other states too) transfer appears to have become an industry. Government servants are often treated like shuttle cocks, to be banged and battered around frequently without any thought of the effect this is having on their morale and on the administration.”
Corruption is not the only motive. It is done not only to reward but also to punish. This is one way to bend the entire district administration to your will. Sometimes caste or communal politics dictates postings. On many occasions, chief ministers feel helpless as they are forced to do it to please the powerful factions in their parties.
During the National Development Council’s meeting, some chief ministers rejected the idea of minimum secure tenure on the ground that this would prevent them to remove the wrong ones from the districts. This shows a lack of understanding of the concept. In foreign jurisdictions where this concept has been accepted and applied, there is a provision in rules to remove prematurely those who are found to be incompetent or corrupt or prone to other misconduct.
Fixing a secure minimum tenure for bureaucrats is generally recommended because it will reduce the vulnerability of officers to outside extraneous and illegitimate pressures and influences. The validity of this expectation is now being questioned as some officers start planning for their post retirement benefits too. However, one or two cases of this type can not undermine the usefulness of providing a fixed tenure to officers, as the absence of any sound transfer policy is playing havoc with the morale of officers by putting the right man at the wrong place and the wrong man at the right place.
But besides harming the morale, it is damaging the whole ethos and efficiency of the administrative system. One, frequent changes in the administrative heads of the districts result in poor and delayed implementation of government policies. It takes a fairly long time for the district chiefs to get acquainted with the personality and the problems of their districts, establish rapport with the community leaders and plan the implementation of policies to solve people’s difficulties. Two, frequent transfers also make it difficult for the government to hold the district officers accountable for failure in implementing plans and policies of the state governments. Three, these are the days when not only the private but also the public enterprises in other countries are going in for modern management principles that stress the need to establish targets, prescribe performance indicators and measure officers and departments’ performance against the standards. It is impossible to apply these principles when the officers’ tenure of posting is 3 to 4 months in the districts. Four, it results in wastage of public funds and resources. Besides the transfer allowance given to a large number of officers every two or three months, the inadequate supervision of programmes results in unnecessary wastage. Five, in every state, there are some appointments that are considered hard, either in terms of absence of basic facilities in places of postings or on account of arduous and perilous nature of the new job. Transfer orders to such places invariably bring pressures for cancellation. Induction of good officers into such places can be ensured only when the scheme of fixed minimum tenure is accepted and implemented with sincerity. This will benefit the less developed areas.
The Hota Committee on Civil Service Reforms have rightly said in their 2004 report that: “good administration is not possible without continuity and intelligent administration is not possible without local knowledge.” Both require a minimum fixed tenure to be provided to officers.
(Original version of an article that was published in the Hindu dated October 16, 2005
During the daytime, the Prime Minister tells the district magistrates of the country in a meeting held on May 15, 2005 that they must have a fixed tenure of posting. By evening the same day, the news comes that the District Magistrates of Siwan and Gopalganj, who had ordered externment of the two RJD MPs Mohammad Shabuddin and Anirudh Singh out of their districts, were transferred by the Governor of Bihar, allegedly at the behest of the Railway Minister, Lalu Prasad Yadav. It, therefore, didn’t come as a surprise when the PM’s address to the Chief Ministers reiterating the same suggestion during the 51st session of the National Development Council on June 27 in New Delhi, fell somewhat flat. More chief ministers opposed than accepted the idea
The Prime Minister suggested to the chief ministers that officials should be entitled to a minimum security of tenure so that they could be judged whether they were equal to the tasks assigned to them. He is obviously interested in reforming the civil administration, but he knows that it is not merely the babus who have weakened the steel frame, but also the politicians. That is why in his address to the district magistrates he said that all was not well with the way the political system was functioning: “Many a time, politics becomes an instrument of self-aggrandisement and ceases to be an instrument of social change.”
Unfortunately, this is happening frequently and one instrument of self-aggrandisment that the politicians have been using with impunity for long is the power of transfers and postings. The blatant and persistent abuse of this power has become what the Hon’ble justice M Katju of Allahabad High Court in his judgement in Civil Miscellaneous Writ petition No. 27123 of 1996 rightly called a “pernicious virus” that has crept into the governance. This virus has particularly affected the district administration badly. . A study of postings of IPS officers in the districts of UP during the year 2004 shows that as many as 153 officers headed the police forces in 70 districts during the year at an average of about 2.2 per district. Four Superintendents of Police headed each of the district police forces in Kushinagar, Jalaun, Mainpuri, Ferozabad and Baghpat and 17 districts saw at least three officers heading each of their police forces during the year. In other words, an officer joins the district and remains there on an average for 3 or 4 months in a year before the new man comes to take over from him. Mr. Madhav Godbole, the former Union Home Secretary, calls this policy “a transfer mela” that “gets converted into a wholesale market where posts often go to the highest bidder.” Justice Katju said more or less the same thing when he observed in the above-mentioned judgement: “It is regrettable that in this State (and perhaps in other states too) transfer appears to have become an industry. Government servants are often treated like shuttle cocks, to be banged and battered around frequently without any thought of the effect this is having on their morale and on the administration.”
Corruption is not the only motive. It is done not only to reward but also to punish. This is one way to bend the entire district administration to your will. Sometimes caste or communal politics dictates postings. On many occasions, chief ministers feel helpless as they are forced to do it to please the powerful factions in their parties.
During the National Development Council’s meeting, some chief ministers rejected the idea of minimum secure tenure on the ground that this would prevent them to remove the wrong ones from the districts. This shows a lack of understanding of the concept. In foreign jurisdictions where this concept has been accepted and applied, there is a provision in rules to remove prematurely those who are found to be incompetent or corrupt or prone to other misconduct.
Fixing a secure minimum tenure for bureaucrats is generally recommended because it will reduce the vulnerability of officers to outside extraneous and illegitimate pressures and influences. The validity of this expectation is now being questioned as some officers start planning for their post retirement benefits too. However, one or two cases of this type can not undermine the usefulness of providing a fixed tenure to officers, as the absence of any sound transfer policy is playing havoc with the morale of officers by putting the right man at the wrong place and the wrong man at the right place.
But besides harming the morale, it is damaging the whole ethos and efficiency of the administrative system. One, frequent changes in the administrative heads of the districts result in poor and delayed implementation of government policies. It takes a fairly long time for the district chiefs to get acquainted with the personality and the problems of their districts, establish rapport with the community leaders and plan the implementation of policies to solve people’s difficulties. Two, frequent transfers also make it difficult for the government to hold the district officers accountable for failure in implementing plans and policies of the state governments. Three, these are the days when not only the private but also the public enterprises in other countries are going in for modern management principles that stress the need to establish targets, prescribe performance indicators and measure officers and departments’ performance against the standards. It is impossible to apply these principles when the officers’ tenure of posting is 3 to 4 months in the districts. Four, it results in wastage of public funds and resources. Besides the transfer allowance given to a large number of officers every two or three months, the inadequate supervision of programmes results in unnecessary wastage. Five, in every state, there are some appointments that are considered hard, either in terms of absence of basic facilities in places of postings or on account of arduous and perilous nature of the new job. Transfer orders to such places invariably bring pressures for cancellation. Induction of good officers into such places can be ensured only when the scheme of fixed minimum tenure is accepted and implemented with sincerity. This will benefit the less developed areas.
The Hota Committee on Civil Service Reforms have rightly said in their 2004 report that: “good administration is not possible without continuity and intelligent administration is not possible without local knowledge.” Both require a minimum fixed tenure to be provided to officers.
(Original version of an article that was published in the Hindu dated October 16, 2005
Wednesday, August 31, 2005
CHANGE THE POLICE SYSTEM
AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER
The PM will address District Superintendents of Police on September 1 in New Delhi
Dear Prime Minister
I am writing this open letter to you on a subject that is very close to my heart i.e. police reforms. I am writing to you as a former police officer and as a citizen who wants the best for his country just as you do.
Two factors prompt me to write to you. One, you have shown an interest in reforming the civil administration and I believe that the police is a very important part of that administration. Two, I am fully convinced that police reforms are too important to neglect and too urgent to delay. A developing economy requires a climate of peace and stability. If development has to take place at a rapid pace, crime must be controlled and peace must prevail. If the secular fabric of our polity has to be preserved, citizens, particularly the poor, downtrodden and marginalized groups, must have access to justice. Controlling crime, maintaining law and order and providing access to justice is dependent upon the establishment of a police force, which is efficient, honest and professional to the core.
Do we have such a police force? Not if we go by the findings of various commissions, complaints received by the human rights commissions, the stories reported by the press and the experiences of common people. 58 years after Independence, our police are still governed by the Police Act of 1861. The police system established by this Act was governed by the sole consideration of defending the establishment rather than providing sensitive and friendly policing to the people.
Under this Act, the police forces have been structured, groomed and controlled to be loyal and subservient to the rulers and not to the people. The police are thus seen by citizens not as servants of law but of the regime in power. The advent of Independence changed the political system, but the police system remained unaltered. The Police Act of 1861 continues to govern it. Its managerial philosophy, value system and ethos remain unchanged.
Politicians and bureaucrats continue to exercise control over the police unchecked and not always for legitimate ends. The police were supportive to the rulers and establishment, considerably distant from the community. And they continue ...In fact, the police are now too often, as in Gujarat and Gurgaon, the architects of my shame as a citizen.
If we missed the opportunity to change the system in 1947, let’s at least change it now — 58 years after Independence. The state police forces in this country are about 1.4 million strong. If the central police organizations are also included, the strength exceeds two million. This huge reservoir of trained manpower can do enormous good to society, provided they are developed to change from a feudal force to a democratic service. A professionally efficient, honest and democratic police service can give far better returns in terms of winning public support than a force which is misused for selfish purposes.
A misused police force gets corrupt and brutalised and in turn abuses its powers and this is what has been happening in different parts of the country for so long. Inevitably, the victims of police abuses are common poor persons, whose anger is spilling into contempt for law, violence, vigilantism and even armed resistance. Policing is, of course, not the direct responsibility of the central government as the Police & Public Order are placed by Article 246 of the Constitution in the State List.
The central government, however, has the option of implementing police reforms in the union territories. This will enable them to acquire the moral authority to ask the state governments to follow suit. The central government has the leverage to encourage state governments to reform their police forces by setting norms and standards and implementing them in the union territories, issuing policy directions, releasing of central grants for modernization and housing dependent on police performance and behaviour etc.
The idea of police reforms needs to be pursued simultaneously in two directions. One is to establish statutory institutional and other arrangements that insulate the police from undesirable and illegitimate political control and help in ensuring that police perform in strict accordance with law. I would also urge the establishment of an independent police performance board that enables the government to monitor and assess police performance against objective criteria and take corrective steps to improve performance. Ensuring police accountability for wrongdoing can best be done by setting up an independent civic oversight mechanism that can handle public complaints against police misconduct fairly and efficiently.
The other direction is to think in terms of all that can be done to strengthen and improve policing within the existing set up. Besides improvement in recruitment, training and leadership at all levels, the status of constabulary, which constitutes 87 per cent of the police force, needs immediate improvement. In short, the need for police reforms is evident and urgent and the country can neglect it only at its peril. I am confident that a man of your vision and experience would not allow any further delay in reforming this sick but a vitally important institution.
Yours sincerely,
G.P. Joshi
(Published in the Indian Express dated August 31, 2005)
The PM will address District Superintendents of Police on September 1 in New Delhi
Dear Prime Minister
I am writing this open letter to you on a subject that is very close to my heart i.e. police reforms. I am writing to you as a former police officer and as a citizen who wants the best for his country just as you do.
Two factors prompt me to write to you. One, you have shown an interest in reforming the civil administration and I believe that the police is a very important part of that administration. Two, I am fully convinced that police reforms are too important to neglect and too urgent to delay. A developing economy requires a climate of peace and stability. If development has to take place at a rapid pace, crime must be controlled and peace must prevail. If the secular fabric of our polity has to be preserved, citizens, particularly the poor, downtrodden and marginalized groups, must have access to justice. Controlling crime, maintaining law and order and providing access to justice is dependent upon the establishment of a police force, which is efficient, honest and professional to the core.
Do we have such a police force? Not if we go by the findings of various commissions, complaints received by the human rights commissions, the stories reported by the press and the experiences of common people. 58 years after Independence, our police are still governed by the Police Act of 1861. The police system established by this Act was governed by the sole consideration of defending the establishment rather than providing sensitive and friendly policing to the people.
Under this Act, the police forces have been structured, groomed and controlled to be loyal and subservient to the rulers and not to the people. The police are thus seen by citizens not as servants of law but of the regime in power. The advent of Independence changed the political system, but the police system remained unaltered. The Police Act of 1861 continues to govern it. Its managerial philosophy, value system and ethos remain unchanged.
Politicians and bureaucrats continue to exercise control over the police unchecked and not always for legitimate ends. The police were supportive to the rulers and establishment, considerably distant from the community. And they continue ...In fact, the police are now too often, as in Gujarat and Gurgaon, the architects of my shame as a citizen.
If we missed the opportunity to change the system in 1947, let’s at least change it now — 58 years after Independence. The state police forces in this country are about 1.4 million strong. If the central police organizations are also included, the strength exceeds two million. This huge reservoir of trained manpower can do enormous good to society, provided they are developed to change from a feudal force to a democratic service. A professionally efficient, honest and democratic police service can give far better returns in terms of winning public support than a force which is misused for selfish purposes.
A misused police force gets corrupt and brutalised and in turn abuses its powers and this is what has been happening in different parts of the country for so long. Inevitably, the victims of police abuses are common poor persons, whose anger is spilling into contempt for law, violence, vigilantism and even armed resistance. Policing is, of course, not the direct responsibility of the central government as the Police & Public Order are placed by Article 246 of the Constitution in the State List.
The central government, however, has the option of implementing police reforms in the union territories. This will enable them to acquire the moral authority to ask the state governments to follow suit. The central government has the leverage to encourage state governments to reform their police forces by setting norms and standards and implementing them in the union territories, issuing policy directions, releasing of central grants for modernization and housing dependent on police performance and behaviour etc.
The idea of police reforms needs to be pursued simultaneously in two directions. One is to establish statutory institutional and other arrangements that insulate the police from undesirable and illegitimate political control and help in ensuring that police perform in strict accordance with law. I would also urge the establishment of an independent police performance board that enables the government to monitor and assess police performance against objective criteria and take corrective steps to improve performance. Ensuring police accountability for wrongdoing can best be done by setting up an independent civic oversight mechanism that can handle public complaints against police misconduct fairly and efficiently.
The other direction is to think in terms of all that can be done to strengthen and improve policing within the existing set up. Besides improvement in recruitment, training and leadership at all levels, the status of constabulary, which constitutes 87 per cent of the police force, needs immediate improvement. In short, the need for police reforms is evident and urgent and the country can neglect it only at its peril. I am confident that a man of your vision and experience would not allow any further delay in reforming this sick but a vitally important institution.
Yours sincerely,
G.P. Joshi
(Published in the Indian Express dated August 31, 2005)
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