Does Supreme Court’s Judgement Protect CBI’s Reputation?
The recent judgement of the Supreme Court, directing Ranjit Sinha to recuse himself from the 2G spectrum case, has evoked a mixed response. While the order assures that the court will not allow the investigation of this important case to be compromised, it simultaneously refrains from explicitly stating detailed reasons for its order. The idea of not doing so, in the words of the court, is twofold- to protect the faith in the institution and the reputation of the director. In reality, it does neither.
Over the last few years, we have heard enormous criticism of the way the CBI has been functioning, most of it coming not merely from the opposition parties but from the judiciary too. The apex court did its first comprehensive examination of the organisation’s functioning in the Vineet Narain case in the nineties of the last century. In that case it pulled up the CBI for showing “inertia” to investigate offences involving influential persons and directed it “not to report the progress of the investigations to the person occupying the highest office in the political executive.” The court also suggested institutional and other arrangements aimed at insulating the CBI from outside influences.
All this did not prove to be of much help as the government did not implement the judgement fully and honestly. The CBI remained vulnerable to outside pressures and continued to face stringent criticism from the court in many cases for its biased functioning. The court slammed the investigating agency for dilly dallying in disproportionate assets cases of Mayawati and Mulayam Singh during the last decade and more recently for dragging its feet in probing the 2G case and coal block allocations during 2006-09. Ranjit Sinha was in charge of the CBI when the court called the agency a “caged parrot.”
In short, the reputation of the institution has been besmirched over a period of time and the conduct of Sinha in the present case tarnishes it further. The reticence of the court by withholding details produces two outcomes. One, it enables the director to brazen it out and remain glued to his chair. Two, it gives rise to an impression that there is considerable evidence of Sinha’s misdemeanors. If it is revealed, it will hurt the credibility of the organisation and its director. By withholding information, the result achieved is the opposite of what the court wants.
The government too has been somewhat reluctant to take action. Though Sinha was appointed by UPA despite objections by the BJP, the silence of the ruling party during the few months when the diary at Sinha’s residence had become public knowledge is not understandable. The government always has powers to probe into suspected misbehavior and take disciplinary action.
Besides other rules and regulations, there is a Code of Behavior for police officers prescribed by the National Police Commission and accepted by the government. Article 3 of this Code stipulates that no police officer shall conduct himself in such a manner as is “reasonably likely to bring discredit” to the “reputation of the police force or of the police service.” Ranjit Sinha’s conduct has definitely brought discredit to himself as well as to the organisation. There is no point in saying, as some retired directors of the CBI have done in the media that the court’s order brings only the chief of the agency into disrepute and not the organisation. The image of any establishment, particularly a hierarchical organisation like the police, is made or marred to a great extent by the policies, priorities and conduct of its chief.
While deliberating the coal scam status report, the apex court had said that their “first exercise will be to liberate CBI from political interference.” This has not happened. The government has always been reluctant to do this exercise earnestly. Neither the UPA nor the present NDA has come out with any law or taken other measures that will make the CBI a professionally efficient and impartial organisation. The danger is that this Ranjit Sinha episode may provide a handle to the government to further tighten its control over the investigating agency. Arun Jaitley has already started talking of a “gap in law” that allows Ranjit Sinha to remain in chair and the government’s inability to do anything in this regard. The gap to which Jaitley is referring is contained in sub-section 4 B (i) of section 26 of the Central Vigilance Act of 2003, according to which Director, Delhi Special Police Establishment shall “continue to hold office for a period of not less than two years from the date on which he assumes office.” Mr. Jaitley does not talk about the other sub section of this section, which clearly suggests that the director can be transferred with the “previous consent of the Committee referred to in sub-section (1) of section 4A” This is the committee that recommends names to government for selection to the post of director. The government could have convened a meeting of this committee if it wanted to remove Sinha from his job.
Instead of using this judgement to strengthen its control over the CBI, the government as a part of its declared objective of providing good governance must take steps to make this premier investigating agency a professionally efficient, objective and impartial organisation. The first step necessary for this purpose is to replace the antiquated and inadequate piece of legislation called the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946 that governs it presently with a law that enables it to function without fear or favour, while making it accountable for its performance and conduct.
The recent judgement of the Supreme Court, directing Ranjit Sinha to recuse himself from the 2G spectrum case, has evoked a mixed response. While the order assures that the court will not allow the investigation of this important case to be compromised, it simultaneously refrains from explicitly stating detailed reasons for its order. The idea of not doing so, in the words of the court, is twofold- to protect the faith in the institution and the reputation of the director. In reality, it does neither.
Over the last few years, we have heard enormous criticism of the way the CBI has been functioning, most of it coming not merely from the opposition parties but from the judiciary too. The apex court did its first comprehensive examination of the organisation’s functioning in the Vineet Narain case in the nineties of the last century. In that case it pulled up the CBI for showing “inertia” to investigate offences involving influential persons and directed it “not to report the progress of the investigations to the person occupying the highest office in the political executive.” The court also suggested institutional and other arrangements aimed at insulating the CBI from outside influences.
All this did not prove to be of much help as the government did not implement the judgement fully and honestly. The CBI remained vulnerable to outside pressures and continued to face stringent criticism from the court in many cases for its biased functioning. The court slammed the investigating agency for dilly dallying in disproportionate assets cases of Mayawati and Mulayam Singh during the last decade and more recently for dragging its feet in probing the 2G case and coal block allocations during 2006-09. Ranjit Sinha was in charge of the CBI when the court called the agency a “caged parrot.”
In short, the reputation of the institution has been besmirched over a period of time and the conduct of Sinha in the present case tarnishes it further. The reticence of the court by withholding details produces two outcomes. One, it enables the director to brazen it out and remain glued to his chair. Two, it gives rise to an impression that there is considerable evidence of Sinha’s misdemeanors. If it is revealed, it will hurt the credibility of the organisation and its director. By withholding information, the result achieved is the opposite of what the court wants.
The government too has been somewhat reluctant to take action. Though Sinha was appointed by UPA despite objections by the BJP, the silence of the ruling party during the few months when the diary at Sinha’s residence had become public knowledge is not understandable. The government always has powers to probe into suspected misbehavior and take disciplinary action.
Besides other rules and regulations, there is a Code of Behavior for police officers prescribed by the National Police Commission and accepted by the government. Article 3 of this Code stipulates that no police officer shall conduct himself in such a manner as is “reasonably likely to bring discredit” to the “reputation of the police force or of the police service.” Ranjit Sinha’s conduct has definitely brought discredit to himself as well as to the organisation. There is no point in saying, as some retired directors of the CBI have done in the media that the court’s order brings only the chief of the agency into disrepute and not the organisation. The image of any establishment, particularly a hierarchical organisation like the police, is made or marred to a great extent by the policies, priorities and conduct of its chief.
While deliberating the coal scam status report, the apex court had said that their “first exercise will be to liberate CBI from political interference.” This has not happened. The government has always been reluctant to do this exercise earnestly. Neither the UPA nor the present NDA has come out with any law or taken other measures that will make the CBI a professionally efficient and impartial organisation. The danger is that this Ranjit Sinha episode may provide a handle to the government to further tighten its control over the investigating agency. Arun Jaitley has already started talking of a “gap in law” that allows Ranjit Sinha to remain in chair and the government’s inability to do anything in this regard. The gap to which Jaitley is referring is contained in sub-section 4 B (i) of section 26 of the Central Vigilance Act of 2003, according to which Director, Delhi Special Police Establishment shall “continue to hold office for a period of not less than two years from the date on which he assumes office.” Mr. Jaitley does not talk about the other sub section of this section, which clearly suggests that the director can be transferred with the “previous consent of the Committee referred to in sub-section (1) of section 4A” This is the committee that recommends names to government for selection to the post of director. The government could have convened a meeting of this committee if it wanted to remove Sinha from his job.
Instead of using this judgement to strengthen its control over the CBI, the government as a part of its declared objective of providing good governance must take steps to make this premier investigating agency a professionally efficient, objective and impartial organisation. The first step necessary for this purpose is to replace the antiquated and inadequate piece of legislation called the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946 that governs it presently with a law that enables it to function without fear or favour, while making it accountable for its performance and conduct.
