THE CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION
The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) was established by the Government of India in 1964 on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption. The Committee envisaged a wide role for the CVC. It recommended that the CVC should be vested with jurisdiction and power, inter alia, to “inquire into and investigate: (a) complaints against acts or omissions, decisions or recommendation, or administrative procedures or practices on the grounds that they are: (i) wrong or contrary to law; (ii) unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory; (iii) in accordance with a rule of law or a provision of any enactment or a practice that is or may be unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory; or (iv) based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact.” The Government of India did not accept this recommendation. The Resolution with which the CVC was set up did not have this clause in its charter of functions.
From 1964 to 1997, for more than three decades, the CVC rolled along without making any visible dent on the problem of corruption in the country. A very important milestone in its history occurred when the Supreme Court pronounced its judgement in what is popularly known as the Hawala Case in 1997.
The Court felt that the CVC established through a government Resolution had failed to function effectively. It, therefore, recommended that the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) should be given a statutory status.
The government of the day asked the Law Commission of India for a report. The Law Commission submitted its report to the Government on 13 August 1998 and also sent the draft of the CVC Bill, incorporating the apex court’s recommendations. The Government of India did not accept the draft bill fully. On 25 August 1998, they hurriedly promulgated the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance,1998 in accordance with a draft prepared by some bureaucrats. As this received considerable criticism, the government promulgated another ordinance, the Central Vigilance Commission(Amendment) Ordinance, 1998 on 27 October 1998. Finally, the government decided to replace the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1998 and the Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 1998 with regular legislation. It drafted the Central Vigilance Commission Bill, 1998 and introduced it in the Lok Sabha on 12 December1998. The Bill lapsed and introduced again in the Lok Sabha on 20 December 1999 to finally become the Central Vigilance Commission Act of 2003. It thus took about six years for the government to put the CVC on a statutory basis since the apex court pronounced its judgemet and that also after considerably diluting its recommendations..
The CVC Act departed from the Supreme Court’s judgement on several points, but two of these are relevant in today’s context. One was about the procedure for the selection of the Central Vigilance Commissioner and the other was about CVC’s authority to exercise superintendence over the CBI
The Law Commission’s Draft Bill had laid down qualifications for the appointment of vigilance commissioners. The Chief Vigilance Commissioner and the Vigilance Commissioners must be persons known for their “ability, integrity, independence and efficiency.” The Supreme Court had also decreed that selection for the post of Central Vigilance Commissioner should be made from a “panel of outstanding civil servants and others with impeccable integrity.” The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 did not insist on such qualifications. All that Section 3 (3) of the Act requires is that the chief and the other members of the Commission shall be appointed from amongst persons “(a) who have been or are in an All-India Service or in any civil service of the Union …. having knowledge and experience in the matters relating to vigilance, policy making and administration including police administration” or (b) who have held office or are holding office in a corporation or a company owned or controlled by the Central Government and persons who have “expertise and experience in finance, law, vigilance and investigations” Thus while the Act insists on having persons with administrative and other types of experience, it is definitely mute about their integrity antecedents. The Act does not make it necessary for the selected persons to be either “outstanding” or have “impeccable integrity.” Merely being civil servants with experience is enough. That is how the UPA government could try ad appoint Mr P J Thomas as the CVC in 2010 despite his doubtful integrity till it was finally turned down by the apex court. The appointment of the present CVC K C Chowdhary was also mired in the controversy and challenged in the court, though without success.
The Supreme Court had also directed that the Central Vigilance Commission should be entrusted with the responsibility of exercising superintendence over the functioning of the CBI. The CVC Act, on the other hand, prescribes that the Commission shall “exercise superintendence over the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment in so far as it relates to the investigation of offences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or an offence with which a public servant ......may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, be charged at the same trial.” The Act thus introduced a system of dual control over the CBI- one exercised by the CVC in respect of corruption cases registered against certain categories of public servants mentioned in the Act and the other by the Central Government in respect of its other cases, which are not corruption related. The administrative superintendence over the work of CBI in any case rests with the government. The argument given by the government that their recent action against the two top officers of the CBI was taken on the recommendations of the CVC is, therefore, not very convincing. It is not for the CVC to recommend administrative action like sending officers on leave.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, in its Nineteenth Report on Demand for Grants (2007-08) presented to the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on 10 May 2007, recommended that CVC’s problems should be addressed immediately to “ensure independence, impartiality and credibility of the apex anti-corruption body.” Obviously, the concerns remain unaddressed.
The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) was established by the Government of India in 1964 on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption. The Committee envisaged a wide role for the CVC. It recommended that the CVC should be vested with jurisdiction and power, inter alia, to “inquire into and investigate: (a) complaints against acts or omissions, decisions or recommendation, or administrative procedures or practices on the grounds that they are: (i) wrong or contrary to law; (ii) unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory; (iii) in accordance with a rule of law or a provision of any enactment or a practice that is or may be unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory; or (iv) based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact.” The Government of India did not accept this recommendation. The Resolution with which the CVC was set up did not have this clause in its charter of functions.
From 1964 to 1997, for more than three decades, the CVC rolled along without making any visible dent on the problem of corruption in the country. A very important milestone in its history occurred when the Supreme Court pronounced its judgement in what is popularly known as the Hawala Case in 1997.
The Court felt that the CVC established through a government Resolution had failed to function effectively. It, therefore, recommended that the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) should be given a statutory status.
The government of the day asked the Law Commission of India for a report. The Law Commission submitted its report to the Government on 13 August 1998 and also sent the draft of the CVC Bill, incorporating the apex court’s recommendations. The Government of India did not accept the draft bill fully. On 25 August 1998, they hurriedly promulgated the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance,1998 in accordance with a draft prepared by some bureaucrats. As this received considerable criticism, the government promulgated another ordinance, the Central Vigilance Commission(Amendment) Ordinance, 1998 on 27 October 1998. Finally, the government decided to replace the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1998 and the Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 1998 with regular legislation. It drafted the Central Vigilance Commission Bill, 1998 and introduced it in the Lok Sabha on 12 December1998. The Bill lapsed and introduced again in the Lok Sabha on 20 December 1999 to finally become the Central Vigilance Commission Act of 2003. It thus took about six years for the government to put the CVC on a statutory basis since the apex court pronounced its judgemet and that also after considerably diluting its recommendations..
The CVC Act departed from the Supreme Court’s judgement on several points, but two of these are relevant in today’s context. One was about the procedure for the selection of the Central Vigilance Commissioner and the other was about CVC’s authority to exercise superintendence over the CBI
The Law Commission’s Draft Bill had laid down qualifications for the appointment of vigilance commissioners. The Chief Vigilance Commissioner and the Vigilance Commissioners must be persons known for their “ability, integrity, independence and efficiency.” The Supreme Court had also decreed that selection for the post of Central Vigilance Commissioner should be made from a “panel of outstanding civil servants and others with impeccable integrity.” The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 did not insist on such qualifications. All that Section 3 (3) of the Act requires is that the chief and the other members of the Commission shall be appointed from amongst persons “(a) who have been or are in an All-India Service or in any civil service of the Union …. having knowledge and experience in the matters relating to vigilance, policy making and administration including police administration” or (b) who have held office or are holding office in a corporation or a company owned or controlled by the Central Government and persons who have “expertise and experience in finance, law, vigilance and investigations” Thus while the Act insists on having persons with administrative and other types of experience, it is definitely mute about their integrity antecedents. The Act does not make it necessary for the selected persons to be either “outstanding” or have “impeccable integrity.” Merely being civil servants with experience is enough. That is how the UPA government could try ad appoint Mr P J Thomas as the CVC in 2010 despite his doubtful integrity till it was finally turned down by the apex court. The appointment of the present CVC K C Chowdhary was also mired in the controversy and challenged in the court, though without success.
The Supreme Court had also directed that the Central Vigilance Commission should be entrusted with the responsibility of exercising superintendence over the functioning of the CBI. The CVC Act, on the other hand, prescribes that the Commission shall “exercise superintendence over the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment in so far as it relates to the investigation of offences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or an offence with which a public servant ......may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, be charged at the same trial.” The Act thus introduced a system of dual control over the CBI- one exercised by the CVC in respect of corruption cases registered against certain categories of public servants mentioned in the Act and the other by the Central Government in respect of its other cases, which are not corruption related. The administrative superintendence over the work of CBI in any case rests with the government. The argument given by the government that their recent action against the two top officers of the CBI was taken on the recommendations of the CVC is, therefore, not very convincing. It is not for the CVC to recommend administrative action like sending officers on leave.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, in its Nineteenth Report on Demand for Grants (2007-08) presented to the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on 10 May 2007, recommended that CVC’s problems should be addressed immediately to “ensure independence, impartiality and credibility of the apex anti-corruption body.” Obviously, the concerns remain unaddressed.
